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Abstracts
This thesis consists of three essays. The first, titled “Do institutional in-
vestors care about corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility?” in-
vestigates how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Social
Irresponsibility (CSiR) change when the degree of monitoring by institutional
investors varies. We exploit changes in institutional investor distraction due
to extreme events in unrelated industries, which is a plausible exogenous
source of variation in monitoring intensity. We show that tighter monitor-
ing reduces both CSR and CSiR. The impact on the former is mainly found
in contexts prone to agency conflicts, while the effect on the latter is con-
centrated in settings where there is a demand for advising. Our results are
robust to alternative definitions of monitoring intensity and CSR.
In the second chapter, “The bright side of stock repurchases,” I provide
evidence of actual stock repurchases increasing future investment in firms
subject to strong asymmetric information that are reliant on external capital
markets. To address endogeneity, I use an instrumental variables approach
based on price pressures created by mutual funds’ liquidity needs. The results
are consistent with firms using actual repurchases to signal their type, which
eases access to capital markets and ultimately improves real outcomes.
The third chapter, “The role of accounting quality during mutual fund
fire sales,” explores the role of accounting quality in mitigating firm’s un-
dervaluation in the stock market generated by mutual funds liquidity needs,
which is plausible exogenous to firms prospects. We find that the prices of
firms with better accounting quality have lower deviations from fundamen-
tal value compared to their lower quality counterparts. We show that the
results hold after controlling for firm complexity, alternative definitions of
accounting quality, and model specifications. Our results indicate that ac-
counting quality plays a crucial role in enhancing market efficiency during
severe mispricing periods.
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Chapter 1
Do institutional investors care
about corporate social
responsibility and
irresponsibility?
1.1 Introduction
Institutional investors are the largest type of shareholder in public corpora-
tions in the United States, owning approximately 70% of total shares out-
standing. Empirical evidence shows that they influence corporate policies
and governance. Institutional investors are generally a key monitoring agent
for corporate governance. They promote performance-based CEO compensa-
tion (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005), improve merger outcomes (Chen,
Harford, and Li, 2007; Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015; Kempf, Manconi, and
Spalt, 2017), and actively influence corporate policies such as innovation
and payout (Bushee, 1998; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; Crane,
Michenaud, and Weston, 2016; Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016; Bena, Fer-
reira, Matos, and Pires, 2017; Bird and Karolyi, 2017). In this study, we
investigate how monitoring by institutional investors shapes Corporate So-
cial Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR). Us-
ing an exogenous source of variation in monitoring by institutional investors,
we show that tighter monitoring by this type of shareholder reduces both
CSR and CSiR. While the reduction in the former is driven by firms prone
10
to agency conflicts, the drop in the latter is cause by firm with a larger need
for external advising.
CSR is defined as the set of proactive policies that a firm voluntar-
ily adopts to improve the wellbeing of various stakeholders and society at
large, including charitable contributions and voluntary programs for employ-
ees (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). These activities are beyond the re-
quirement of the law (Mosley, Pietri, and Megginson, 1996). Conversely,
CSiR captures social and environmental misbehavior linked to future eco-
nomic penalties or civil fines (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Ioannou and
Serafeim, 2015; Kru¨ger, 2015). At present, there is increasing interest in the
extent to which companies are aligning their economic objectives with the
social and environmental needs of the communities in which they run their
businesses. Companies worldwide are taking social and environmental ob-
jectives into account when designing their corporate strategies. For instance,
firms in the Fortune 500 are spending more than $15 billion dollars yearly in a
wide range of social and environmental activities, such as in-kind donations,
cash contributions or employee volunteer programs (Smith, 2014).
The literature on CSR proposes on the one hand, that these activities
enhance shareholder value by developing a competitive advantage. This
competitive advantage would arise from efficient contracting with different
stakeholders of the corporation (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). Alternatively,
Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) and Hong and Liskovich (2014) argue
that CSR might work as insurance (preserving economic value rather than
creating it). On the other hand, the literature also suggests that these ac-
tivities can destroy shareholders’ value when the cost of these activities do
not compensate its benefits (Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2010). This value destruction can arise from the discre-
tion of managers, whose interests are not aligned with those of shareholders
(Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Ma-
sulis and Reza, 2015; Adhikari, 2016).1 Meanwhile, the literature on CSiR
suggests that reducing CSiR might lead to lower future costs (Chatterji,
Levine, and Toffel, 2009; Dimson, Karakas, and Xi, 2015) and lower stock
return volatility (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Godfrey et al., 2009; Hoep-
ner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, and Zhou, 2016).2 However, the benefits
1In line with this argument, Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2016) find that CEO preferences
explains 63% of the variation in CSR (while firms explain 20%), but they do not find a
lower accounting performance in firms with CSR-friendly CEOs.
2For instance, an oil spill or a controversial firing decision will certainly lead to cash
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of corporate misbehavior could outweigh its costs. For instance, Borisov,
Goldman, and Gupta (2015) show that unethical lobbying creates value for
shareholders through potentially corrupt arrangements with policy makers,
while Yu and Yu (2011) provide evidence of lobbying firms having significant
lower hazard rate of being discovered, and being less likely to be detected by
regulators.
Institutional investors have large and diversified portfolios of assets. They
not only care about individual firms’ performance but also the overall return
on the portfolio in which they invest (Hansen and Lott, 1996). Regarding the
former, at the firm level, they will favor value-enhancing actions and discour-
age value-destroying policies. At the portfolio level, firm policies might have
externalities that will affect the return of the other portfolio assets. Borah
and Tellis (2016) show that bad news travel fast on social media and that a
recall event can have harmful effects on the sales and stock market perfor-
mance of innocent rivals. Therefore, institutional investors have incentives to
encourage actions that lead to positive spillovers and discourage those with
negative externalities. Giannetti and Wang (2016) show that scandals in one
state erode trust in the stock market, reducing household stock market par-
ticipation not only in the state in which the fraud occurs but also states where
no fraud occurred. In other words, even when some risks are idiosyncratic
to the firm, they might not be diversified away just by investing in a broader
set of stocks. Similarly, Borah and Tellis (2016) analyze the perverse halo (or
negative spillover) effect of social media, defined as a phenomenon whereby
negative chatter about one brand increases negative chatter about another
brand in the automobile industry. They find that “a one-unit shock in con-
cerns about Honda has a significant negative impact on Toyota’s abnormal
returns (...) In dollar terms, this drop translates into a loss of approximately
$7.3 million from Toyota’s average market capitalization.” (Borah and Tel-
lis, 2016, pp. 155). The contagion effect among households, industry peers
and stocks creates incentives for institutional investors to monitor managers
to minimize the probability of facing social and environmental misbehavior.
Monitoring efforts by institutional investors are not randomly assigned.
Therefore, we use a plausible source of exogenous variation in monitoring
intensity by this type of shareholder (Kempf et al., 2017; Ben-Rephael, Da,
and Israelsen, 2017a; Liu, Low, Masulis, and Zhang, 2017). We analyze how
outflows in the form of penalties or settlements and increase firm risk. It can also lead to
substantial reputational costs.
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CSR and CSiR change when institutional investors deviate their attention
away from the firm for reasons unrelated to that firm. Following Kempf
et al. (2017), we exploit the fact that when stock returns in one industry are
extremely high or low, shareholders shift their attention to the firms in their
portfolio that belong to those industries, paying less attention to the rest of
their investments. This loosening of monitoring activities not only creates an
opportunity for managers to extract rents from shareholders, but also blocks
managers access to external advising. We find that CSR increases when
institutional investors are distracted, consistent with the literature suggesting
that this investors deter those activities that destroy value (Hong et al., 2012;
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Adhikari, 2016; Masulis and Reza, 2015).
We also find that distraction increases CSiR, consistent with institutional
investors promoting activities that are more likely to lead to increases in
shareholder value (Chatterji et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2015; Bansal and
Clelland, 2004; Godfrey et al., 2009; Hoepner et al., 2016).
Institutional investors often do not content themselves with the pure
monitoring of managerial decision making (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Jensen, 1986; Almazan et al., 2005) but offer expertise and external advising
to aid the top management team (e.g., Lerner, 1995; Casamatta, 2003; Re-
pullo and Suarez, 2004; Tirole, 2010). We explore the effect of institutional
investor monitoring in settings prone to agency conflicts (entrenched CEOs
and large free cash flows) and those where advising is more valuable or nec-
essary (recently appointed CEOs or short-tenured directors). We find that
institutional investor distraction leads to larger levels of CSR only in settings
that are prone to present agency conflicts. Whereas, institutional investor
attention leads to decreases in CSiR in settings where external advising is
more necessary.
Our results are robust to alternative definitions of institutional investor
monitoring, CSR, and the timing of the effect. First, we assume that the
larger the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors is, the tighter
the monitoring. Thus, we exploit variation in institutional ownership due
to assignment to the Russell 1000/2000 Indexes (Appel et al., 2016; Crane
et al., 2016).3 The instrument exploits the fact that institutional investors
are often benchmarked against an index, and they own shares of index con-
stituents in proportion to the weight that each stock possesses in the index.
3Both indexes are widely used benchmarks, and comparable amounts of money are
invested in each of them (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich, 2015).
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By construction, there is a discontinuity around the bottom firms of the
Russell 1000 and the top firms of the Russell 2000. This mechanical increase
in institutional investor ownership exogenously increases monitoring inten-
sity in treated firms, which allows for a causal interpretation of the results.
The results from this alternative setting match our main findings. Moreover,
this alternative framework allows us to explore the effect of institutional in-
vestors with different investment horizons. We document that our results
are driven primarily by investors with a long-term focus. In addition, we
show robustness tests for alternative measures of CSR provided by Thomson
Reuters’ ESG Scores (formerly known as ASSET4 Equally Weighted Rat-
ings) and employed in previous literature (Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner,
2018).4 We find that institutional investor distraction leads to larger levels
of CSR, again, in settings prone to agency conflicts. Finally, we address
concerns regarding the timing of CSR and CSiR, because previous literature
suggests that changes in social and environmental policies arise with some
lag (e.g., Adhikari, 2016). We show that our results are statistically more
significant when we measure CSR and CSiR in the following year.
There is ample evidence that institutional investors use shareholders’ pro-
posals as a mechanism to change governance policies (see, for instance, Appel
et al., 2016; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2016). Less attention has been
paid to the mechanisms through which institutional investors affect CS(i)R.
We show distraction does not seem to affect the number of social and envi-
ronmental proposals submitted at shareholder meetings, and provide anec-
dotal evidence that there could be some shareholders taking advantage of
institutional investors distraction to pursue their own agendas and increase
social and environmental proposals. Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence
suggests that institutional investors prefer to engage behind-the-curtain, via
constructive dialogue through various engagement actions such as meetings,
calls, emails or letters (McCahery et al., 2016; Hoepner et al., 2016).
Various studies attempt to empirically assess the relationship between
institutional ownership and CSR (see Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and
Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006;
Dyck et al., 2018). Coffey and Fryxell (1991) find contradictory results using
different measures of CSR. They find a positive relationship between institu-
4Unfortunaltely, we cannot provide a robustness test to CSiR using Thomson Reuters
ESG Scores as they are aggregated across the social, environmental and governance di-
mensions. We exclude the governance category from our dependent measures in all of our
analyses following previous literature (e.g., Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014).
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tional ownership and the number of women on the board but a negative rela-
tionship for compliance with the Sullivan principles.5 Graves and Waddock
(1994) is the first study that measures CSR using KLD (now the MSCI ESG
database), the most widely used database for empirical CSR studies. The au-
thors investigate the effect of CSR on institutional investment and find that
CSR increases the number of institutional investors that participate in the
ownership structure of the firm, but they find no effect for the percentage of
institutional ownership. Similarly, Johnson and Greening (1999) distinguish
among different types of institutional investors, i.e., pension funds, mutual
and investment banks, and foundations. They argue that pension funds have
the right incentives to strive for CSR, as they have a long-term investment
horizon and face difficulty in exiting their positions. The authors provide
evidence of a positive association between this type of institutional investor
and CSR. Similarly, Neubaum and Zahra (2006) distinguish among differ-
ent institutional investors based on their investment strategy. The authors
find a positive relationship between institutional ownership by public pension
funds and CSR, moderated by activism and coordination.6 Overall, all stud-
ies share similar empirical characteristics, as they do not account for reverse
causality, omitted variables, or measurement error, which are likely to have
entailed some misspecification. Our study differs from the previous litera-
ture because we use the undiluted measures from the MSCI ESG database
and employ two sources of exogenous variation in monitoring intensity by
institutional investors that allow us to provide causal evidence.
The closest paper to ours is the article by Dyck et al. (2018), which stud-
ies the impact of institutional ownership on the environmental and social
performance of an international sample. The authors find that institutional
ownership has a positive impact on firms’ social and environmental perfor-
mance, and argue for the causality of the relationship using the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in 2010 as an exogenous negative shock that increased de-
mand for larger environmental performance. Our results differ from Dyck
et al. (2018) in the scope of our samples, our measurement of CSR and the
different sources of exogneous variation employed. Our sample comprises
firms incorporated in the US, whereas Dyck et al. (2018) make use of an in-
ternational sample and do not include US firms in their main analyses. There
5The Sullivan principles were intended to create equal treatment of employees regardless
of their race in South Africa during Apartheid.
6They measure activism and coordination by inspecting news coverage of public activ-
ities carried out by institutional investors.
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is no reason to believe that the effect of institutional investors on social and
environmental issues will be the same in different countries. For instance,
Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2017) documents an increase in firm value due to
employee satisfaction in countries with flexible labor markets (such as the
US), but not for countries with rigidities (e.g., Germany). Moreover, the
authors measure environmental and social performance using a net measure
from Thomson Reuters ESG database, while we separate CSR from CSiR
and use the MSCI ESG database. However, that cannot explain the differ-
ences with our papers, because our results are robust to both databases.7
Finally, the authors make use of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010
as an exogenous increase in the demand for environmental performance by
institutional investors, which could be an extreme event in which the reaction
of institutional investors differs from other situations.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the effect of institutional
investors and monitoring on corporate governance. In the context of CEO
compensation, Almazan et al. (2005) find that pay-for-performance sensitiv-
ity is positively related to active institutional ownership. A recent body of
literature analyzes the monitoring role of institutional investors in the con-
text of markets for corporate control (see, for instance, Chen et al., 2007;
Fich et al., 2015; Kempf et al., 2017). Chen et al. (2007) show that large
holdings by this type of investor predict post-merger performance and that
there is a positive association between firms’ withdrawal from the worst deals
and their presence in the firm. Furthermore, Fich et al. (2015) show that
institutional investors produce better acquisition outcomes such as increased
bid completion rates, higher premiums, and lower acquirer returns. Similarly,
Kempf et al. (2017) find that when institutional shareholders are distracted
(a setting with looser shareholder monitoring), managers engage in value-
destroying acquisitions. Finally, institutional investors posses the incentives
and means to actively shape corporate policies such as innovation and divi-
dend payout (Aghion et al., 2013; Crane et al., 2016; Bena et al., 2017). We
add to these sets of papers by showing that institutional investors play a pure
monitoring role with respect to CSR and an advisory role regarding CSiR.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we provide causal
evidence of institutional investors decreasing current levels of CSR activities,
7In Table 7, we report the impact of institutional investor distraction on Thomson
Reuters’ social and environmental scores as dependent variables. Unfortunately, we cannot
make use of the variation in institutional ownership due to the Russell 1000/2000 threshold,
because ASSET4 covers only firms quoted in the Russell 1000 index.
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contrary to prior archival evidence using two exogenous sources of variation
in institutional investor monitoring intensity. We further contribute to the
literature by showing that CSR and CSiR are different empirical constructs
that proxy for distinct types of corporate responsibility. In other words, in-
creasing CSR might not be equivalent to decreasing CSiR, and using proxies
based on the combination of strengths and concerns might not be fully in-
formative. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine
the impact of monitoring by institutional investors on CSiR. We also add to
the literature by showing that institutional investor pure monitoring leads
to decreases in CSR, while their role as external advisors reduces CSiR. Fi-
nally, we examine shareholder-initiated social and environmental proposals
as a mechanism through which institutional investors might affect CS(i)R.
1.2 Data and empirical framework
1.2.1 CSR and CSiR measures
Following previous literature, we define our proxy for CSR as the number of
strengths that a firm has in a given year from MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
(Kacperczyk, 2009; Flammer, 2015; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). This mea-
sure is intended to capture management best practices concerning community
relations, diversity issues, environmental policies, employee relations or prod-
uct characteristics that do not necessarily have a direct link to firm value.8
Moreover, we separately analyze each of the components. CSR comprises
items such as charitable giving, volunteer programs for employees, cash profit-
sharing programs for the workforce, or pollution prevention programs. Some
of these items require substantial resources from firms (Hong and Liskovich,
2014). For instance, to obtain an extra CSR point, a firm must consistently
give over 1.5% of three-year net earnings to charity or have a notably strong
retirement benefits program. Conversely, we define CSiR as the number of
concerns that a firm has in a given year from MSCI ESG. CSiR comprises
social and environmental misconduct that has a direct impact on earnings,
through the recognition of expenses such as fines and penalties. This con-
struct includes items such as tax disputes involving the federal, state or local
government, regulatory problems regarding environmental practices, major
8Following previous studies, we drop the governance and human rights dimensions of
MSCI ESG when constructing our measure of CSR (Flammer, 2018; Davidson et al., 2016).
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controversies or regulatory actions related to antitrust allegations, or invest-
ment controversies related to the Community Reinvestment Act. In addition
to the overall measure of CSiR, we analyze its individual components.
There is no consensus on how CSR should be measured. While some stud-
ies only consider the number of CSR strengths from MSCI ESG (Kacperczyk,
2009; Flammer, 2015; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015), other papers take the dif-
ference between the number of CSR strengths and concerns to construct an
overall index of CSR (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Adhikari, 2016). Mat-
tingly and Berman (2006) argue that strengths and concerns coming from the
MSCI ESG database do not covary and thus should not be aggregated. Fol-
lowing Kacperczyk (2009), Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), and Kru¨ger (2015),
we separate MSCI ESG strengths and concerns to measure CSR and CSiR,
respectively. This is because concerns are theoretically and empirically a dif-
ferent construct from strengths. The empirical evidence confirms that CSR
and CSiR differ. Chatterji et al. (2009) find that CSiR (measured as the
number of MSCI ESG environmental concerns) is a better predictor of fu-
ture environmental performance than is the number of strengths. Kru¨ger
(2015) provides evidence on the short-run effect of corporate social respon-
sibility on shareholder value through a window event analysis using social
and environmentally related news.9 His findings suggest that markets react
moderately negatively to news about strengths but more negatively to news
related to concerns.
1.2.2 Sample selection
Our main sample covers 8 years – 2003 to 2010. Since 2003, MSCI ESG, our
main database for CS(i)R, provides information for firms in the Russell 1000
and Russell 2000. However, in 2011, there was a change in methodology,
which is why we use 2010 as the last year in our sample. We also collect
governance variables from MSCI ESG. We use Compustat for accounting
variables and the Thomson 13F Database for institutional ownership data. In
addition, we use data collected by ISS (formerly Riskmetrics) on shareholder
proposals regarding socially responsible investment. We drop firms with
9He distinguishes between news associated with strengths and concerns—for instance,
being included on the list of the 100 best places to work for mothers would be related
to a diversity strength—and the announcement of a Securities and Exchange Commission
formal investigation in the accounting of a firm would be related to a concern (see Figure
2 in Kru¨ger (2015)).
18
missing values for total assets. Finally, to mitigate the influence of outliers,
all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables
used in this paper. On average, our firms are smaller than those in previous
studies, as we consider firms in the Russell 3000. In our sample, the mean
size is 7.87 (natural logarithm of total assets), while in Flammer (2015), the
mean size is approximately 8, and that in Deng et al. (2013) is approximately
9.1. Because CSR is increasing in firm size, our sample firms have lower CSR.
The mean (median) score is 1.7 (1). The mean and median CSiR score are 1.7
and 1, respectively, which are comparable to Adhikari (2016). On average,
75% of total shares outstanding are owned by institutional investors (similar
to Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014)).
Panels B and C of Table 1 show the transition probabilities for CSR
and CSiR, accumulated by an average firm-year for each. The last row and
column include the probability of having a score of 4 or more. Overall, the
tables suggests that there is considerable persistence in the scores obtained
by the firms each year, which is evidenced by the diagonal probabilities. For
instance, for companies that possess 0 CSR in a given year, the probability of
having the same score the next year is 86%, while the probability of obtaining
1 point is 11%, and the probability of obtaining 2 points is 2.5%. More than
half of our firms have a zero or one CSR score, 13% have 2, 7.6% have 3, and
the remaining 17% of firms have 4 or more. A similar pattern is observed for
CSiR. These values support using a Poisson model to estimate the effect of
monitoring by institutional investors on CSR and CSiR.
1.2.3 Empirical framework
Institutional investors do not randomly select the firms they invest in or
the monitoring intensity they assign to portfolio firms. More likely, they
might choose their portfolio holdings and monitoring based on observable
and unobservable firm characteristics. To address endogeneity, we will ex-
ploit variation in the attention that a firm receives from its institutional
investors following Kempf et al. (2017).10 Several recent papers show that
institutional investors possess limited attention when performing their mon-
itoring activities across their portfolio of investments (Kempf et al., 2017;
10In robustness tests, we exploit variation in the the proportion of shares held in a given
firm (Appel et al., 2016; Crane et al., 2016).
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Ben-Rephael et al., 2017a; Liu et al., 2017). This attention or monitoring
intensity changes over time and depends on its net benefits. Kempf et al.
(2017) show that when monitoring intensity is low (distraction is high), man-
agers engage in value-destroying acquisitions and perform option backdating.
Moreover, when institutional investors are distracted, boards of directors
also relax their monitoring duties: independent directors attend fewer board
meetings, and CEO compensation and accrual-based earnings management
increase (Liu et al., 2017). This reduced institutional investor monitoring
appears to lead to lower board oversight and higher agency costs for share-
holders. Ben-Rephael et al. (2017a) document that institutional investor
attention is key in easing the incorporation of new information into stock
prices.
To study institutional investor distraction, we employ the data provided
by Kempf et al. (2017).11 In their paper, the authors create a firm-specific,
time-varying measure of institutional investors’ distraction that exploits shocks
to different parts of their investment portfolio. Specifically, the authors use
extreme returns in unrelated parts of institutional investors portfolios to
identify periods during which shareholders direct their attention away from
the firm. The authors weight the exposure that an institutional investor
has to the attention-grabbing industry. Finally, they aggregate the weighted
shocks along the firm dimension while considering the share of all institu-
tional investors present in the firm. This gives a measure of how distracted
the institutional investors of a given firm are in a given quarter. The following
equation represents their measure:
Diq =
∑
f∈Si
∑
J 6=Ji
wfiq−1 × wJfq−1 × ISJq
where Diq is the quarter-firm measure of shareholder distraction, wfiq−1 is
the weight of each institutional investor j in firm i and quarter q − 1, wJfq−1
is the weight of industry J in the portfolio of institutional investor f at time
q−1, and ISJq is a dummy variable that takes value one whenever industry J
at time q receives a shock, which is defined as extreme returns in their main
analysis. We create the annual measure of shareholder distraction from the
quarterly variable provided by Kempf et al. (2017). First, we replace with
zeros the quarter with missing values and then averaged it at the annual level.
11We thank Elisabeth Kempf and co-authors for making available their data on share-
holder distraction.
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In their original measure, Kempf et al. (2017) define as missing values those
firm-quarters in which the firm belongs to an extreme-return industry.12 We
are confident that the distraction measure derived in Kempf et al. (2017) is
plausibly exogenous, as no firm can control extreme industry price movements
or the exposure of their shareholder base to such industries.
Thus, we proceed to estimate the following equation:
E(Yit|Xit, τt) = exp(α1Distractionit + β1Xit + τt × φj) (1.1)
where Yit is CSRit or CSiRit, and Distractionit is the measure explained
above.13 Xit are known determinants of CS(i)R that have been previously
considered in the literature: firm size (Firm size), profitability (ROA), book-
to-market (BM), research and development (RD), leverage (Lev), and gov-
ernance (Gov S and Gov C) (Adhikari, 2016; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006;
Johnson and Greening, 1999).14 τt× φj are year times industry fixed effects,
which allows to compare firms within the same industry at the same time.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Institutional investor distraction, CSR and CSiR
The results from estimating Equation 1.1 are presented in Table 2. In column
(1) of Panel A we analyze the impact of distraction on the overall measure
of CSR. The coefficient in Column (1) is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. This implies that an increase in the level of institutional
investor distraction has a positive impact on the probability of obtaining an
extra CSR strength. The economic impact is also large: a 1% increase in the
distraction measure increases CSR by 1.76%.15 In other words, a 1% increase
in institutional investor distraction raises, by almost 2%, the probability of
12In untabulated results we find that the findings are robust to excluding firm years in
which the firm belong to an extreme-return industry at least in one quarter, or to averaging
quarterly observations across non-missing values.
13In our main tests, we regress CSR and CSiR on distraction, contemporaneously. How-
ever, in Section 1.4.3 we show that the results are robust to measuring the dependent
variables in t+ 1.
14Table 1 provides variables definitions.
15We obtain this economic magnitude by estimating the elasticity of CSR to investor
distraction.
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consistently giving more than 1.5% of earnings to charity or doing at least
5% of subcontracting with women- and/or minority-owned businesses. As
noted by Hong and Liskovich (2014), obtaining an extra point on the MSCI
ESG score could be very costly, as it might require having a well-funded
pension plan or giving 5% of net earnings to charity. We conclude that, on
average, when shareholders reduce their monitoring intensity CSR increases.
In the rest of the Panel we explore the effect of a loosening of monitoring at-
tention on the different components of CSR: community, diversity, employee
relations, environment and product (number of strengths in each of the afore-
mentioned categories). The estimates suggest that lower monitoring leads to
higher CSR in almost all the dimensions. Interestingly, the coefficient is not
statistically significant for product. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and Ad-
hikari (2016) argue that this dimension might have strategic implications,
which might explain why it is not sensitive to CEO discretion.16
In Panel B of Table 2 we present evidence on the effect of institutional
investors distraction on the overall proxy for CSiR and its individual dimen-
sions. In column (1) we show that does not seem to be a significant effect
of distraction on CSiR, on average.17 In the rest of the table we show that
this is partly due to the aggregation of different dimensions into one variable.
In particular, the results suggest that a lower monitoring intensity increases
concerns regarding the environment and product dimensions. In other words,
an increase in institutional investor distraction increases the probability of
paying substantial fines or civil penalties for waste management violations or
product safety. This result is consistent with McCahery et al. (2016) which
finds that one of the main triggers of institutional investors engagement is
“Socially irresponsible corporate misbehavior.” The results are not signifi-
cant for community, employee relations and diversity. It could be that either
some of them are not very important from the institutional investor perspec-
tive or that managers are vigilant on some issues even in the absence of an
external monitor.
16According to MSCI ESG, the strengths in the product category are the following:
quality (the company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide quality program),
R&D innovation (the company is a leader in its industry for R&D), benefits to economi-
cally disadvantaged (the firm has as part of its mission the provision of products for the
economically disadvantaged), and other (the firm’s products have notable social benefits
that are highly unusual for its industry).
17In Section 1.4.3 we explore the impact of distraction on CSiR at t + 1 and find a
positive and significant effect at the 5% level.
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The results presented in Panel A of Table 2 are consistent with those
presented by Masulis and Reza (2015), Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) and
Adhikari (2016). Masulis and Reza (2015) show that when the tax saving
created by corporate giving decreases, dividends are increased. Di Giuli and
Kostovetsky (2014) find that “increases in firm CSR ratings are associated
with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that
any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct ex-
pense of firm value”. Then, institutional investors that hold a stake in the
firm and have incentives to monitor the manager (Almazan et al., 2005; Appel
et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2007) reduce CSR because this type of expenditure
destroys value. In a similar vein, Adhikari (2016) finds that firms increase
CSR when analyst coverage decreases. The mechanism is straightforward:
reduced scrutiny by market participants allows managers to spend corporate
resources on pet projects that do not have a direct link to firm value. By
contrast, the results presented in Panel B show that distraction leads to an
increase in corporate controversies. This is consistent with Kru¨ger (2015)
and Chatterji et al. (2009) that provide evidence on the negative shareholder
reaction to social and environmental controversies, and the ability of contro-
versies to predict future performance.
1.3.2 Pure monitoring and advising
Recent survey evidence suggests that institutional investors actively engage
with management (McCahery et al., 2016). This engagement might be in-
tended to reduce agency costs (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Aghion et al., 2013; Appel
et al., 2016), or to bring expertise and advising to help managers make better
decisions (e.g., Lerner, 1995; Casamatta, 2003; Repullo and Suarez, 2004).
The implications from the pure monitoring and the advisory roles are, how-
ever, distinct. While the former is expected when agency costs are higher,
the latter are more likely when the managerial team has lower experience.
In this section we analyze these alternative roles of institutional investors on
CSR and CSiR.
Previous literature documents that CEO power increases with CEO tenure
(e.g., Graham, Kim, and Leary, 2017). On the one hand, powerful (long-
tenured) CEOs are more likely to extract private benefits, and institutional
investors can act as watchdogs to reduce agency costs. On the other hand,
newly appointed CEOs are more likely to need external advising and ex-
pertise to successfully run the firm. In other words, we expect institutional
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investors to act as pure monitors (advisors) in firms in which the execu-
tives have high tenure (low tenure). To explore these alternative roles, we
sort firm-years in which the CEO Tenure is below and above the median of
the sample.18 In Panels A and B of Table 3, we examine these alternative
roles of institutional investors for CSR and CSiR (and their components),
respectively.
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A present the effect of institutional in-
vestor distraction on CSR when advising and pure monitoring, respectively,
are more likely to occur. The results show that distraction matters when
firms have powerful (long-tenured) CEOs that are more likely to take advan-
tage of the loosening of monitoring intensity to pursue some personal projects
that do not necessarily create value. Same conclusions hold when analyzing
the components of CSR (see columns (3) to (12) of Panel A). In particular,
diversity, employee relations and environment increase when shareholders are
distracted in firms more prone to agency costs, but in general (except for di-
versity) distraction has no significant effect on firm with less powerful CEOs.
This result is in line with Kempf et al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017), who
show that managers and boards of directors exploit institutional investor
distraction to conduct value-destroying activities, such as diversifying acqui-
sitions and options backdating. Overall, it seems that the current levels of
CSR activities, which are intended to improve the relationship between the
firm and its stakeholders, are partly due to agency conflicts and represent a
loss of shareholder value. Similarly, Davidson et al. (2016), document that
CEO fixed effects account for more than 50% of the variation in CSR score,
which is evidence of CEOs exerting their preferences when defining social and
environmental policies. Notice that there is no significant effect on product-
related issues, which is not surprising given that this dimension is related
to strategic decisions of the firm rather than a voluntary action intended to
improve stakeholders wellbeing (Adhikari, 2016).
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B show the effect of institutional investor
distraction on CSiR when advising and pure monitoring, respectively, are
more likely to occur. The results show that shareholder distraction is relevant
when advising is more necessary, but it is insignificant at conventional levels.
However, the results are consistent with institutional investors providing ex-
pertise when analyzing the different dimensions of CSiR, at least for some of
18The median is 5 years (see Table 1). We drop firm-years in which we have more than
one CEO (because of CEO turnover).
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them. In particular, the results presented in columns (3) to (12) show that
shareholder distraction matter for environment and product dimensions.19
Interestingly, the results are insignificant for long-tenured CEOs. Overall,
the results suggest that reducing CSiR might be value-enhancing, and that
institutional investor can play a role by advising their investee companies on
these issues.
In Table 4 we show that the results are robust to using alternative setting
in which agency conflicts and the need for advise are more likely to occur.
In Panel A we analyze the effect of institutional investor distraction on CSR
in firms with high and low free cash flows. Consistent with agency problems
being partly responsible for CSR, we find that distraction matters only when
free cash flows are high. Notice that the product dimension remains unaf-
fected by distraction regardless of the potential for agency problems. Finally,
in Panel B we examine the impact of distraction on CSiR for high and low
levels of board tenure. We argue that when board tenure is low, the need for
external advising is greater. In column (1) we show that when firms receive
higher attention by their institutional investors overall CSiR falls when the
external advising is necessary, but it is unaffected when firms can rely on
internal advising (high-tenure average board members). To sum up, the evi-
dence presented in this section provide support for the pure monitoring and
advising role of institutional investors, which constrain costly CSR activities,
and promotes value enhancing policies that reduce CSiR.
1.4 Robustness checks
1.4.1 Alternative definition of institutional investor mon-
itoring
As a robustness to institutional investor monitoring intensity we exploit vari-
ation in institutional investors ownership. Because institutional investors are
sophisticated and have incentives to monitor managers, we assume that the
larger the fraction they own, the tighter the monitoring will be. Follow-
ing Appel et al. (2016), we exploit exogenous variation in the proportion
of shares held by these investors due to their inclusion in the Russell 2000
Index. The intuition behind the instrument is the following. Institutional
19For the employee relations dimension, the results are significant at the 12% level only.
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investors are often benchmarked against an index, and they hold shares of
index constituents based on the weights that each stock has in the index.
The Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 are two widely used benchmarks, and
comparable amounts of money are invested in each of them (Chang et al.,
2015). While the former comprises the largest 1000 stocks in terms of market
capitalization, the latter includes the next 2000 stocks. Because the indexes
are value weighted, the weight assigned to a stock in the bottom of the Rus-
sell 1000 is smaller than the weight of a stock in a top position in the Russell
2000.20 We exploit the fact that because of this benchmarking, some vari-
ation in institutional ownership is exogenously determined. The identifying
assumption is that firms very close to the threshold are similar except for
institutional ownership and market capitalization. Using a fuzzy regression
discontinuity, we instrument institutional ownership by inclusion in the Rus-
sell 2000, controlling for different polynomial orders of market capitalization
(Appel et al., 2016). In the second-stage estimation, we use the predicted
value of institutional ownership.21
Column (1) of Table 5 shows that firms that belong to the top positions
of the Russell 2000 have 13% higher institutional ownership on average than
firms that belong to the bottom positions of the Russell 1000, controlling
for market capitalization and float.22 In Column (2) we separately consider
Quasi-Indexers (Bushee, 1998, 2001) because they are the institutional in-
vestors that react the most to the instrument.23 Columns (3) and (4) show
20For instance, in June 2006, Burger King Holdings, Inc. was one of the smallest stocks
in the Russell 1000 and received an index weight of 0.0031%, whereas JetBlue Airways
Corp. ranked among the top positions of the Russell 2000 with a weight of 0.165%. Then,
for every million dollars invested in each index, an institutional investor benchmarked
against the Russell 1000 will invest $31 in Burger King Holdings, while one benchmarked
against the Russell 2000 will invest $1650 in JetBlue Airways Corp.
21This alternative empirical strategy has a smaller sample size. The sample is restricted
to the stocks around the Russel 1000/2000 threshold between 2004 and 2006. We start
in 2004 because this is the first year that Russell provides us with their proprietary data,
and we finish in 2006 because Russell changed its methodology for index assignment in
2007 and the IV strategy is not valid thereafter.
22For brevity, we only present the results for a 500 bandwidth, but results are qualita-
tively the same when using a 250 bandwidth.
23The identification strategy assumes that institutional investors benchmarked against
the Russell indexes are those that invest in proportion to market capitalization. In
Bushee’s classification, Quasi-Indexers are the closest to this definition. Dedicated In-
vestors invest only in a few stocks and are more likely to cherry pick them. Finally,
Transient Institutional Investors, although highly diversified, maintain their holdings for
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that institutional investors reduce CSR, and the results are economically
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In particular, the elasticity is
1.13, suggesting that a 1% increase in institutional ownership reduces the
probability of improving CSR by 1.13%. Columns (5) and (6) show that
institutional investors reduce CSiR, and the results are economically and
statistically significant at the 1% level. In particular, a 1% increase in insti-
tutional ownership reduces the probability of having an additional concern
by 0.77%. In other words, an exogenous increase in institutional ownership
decreases the probability of being involved in major tax disputes, or having
major health and safety controversies. CSiR could entail large fines or penal-
ties (including reputational costs) that drain cash out of firms and reduce
value. Institutional investors with a sufficiently large stake in the firm have
the incentives to monitor and advise firms regarding tax, environmental and
other controversial issues.
In Table 6, we further explore the components of CSR (Panel A) and CSiR
(Panel B). We present the instrumented results for Quasi-Indexers, which are
the drivers of the effect, but the results are qualitatively similar when using all
institutional investors (available upon request). Consistent with Table 2, the
community, diversity and employee dimensions are reduced when monitoring
is tightened. Interestingly, the estimate for the product dimension is not
statistically significant, as the items considered in the MSCI ESG database
are more likely to be related to strategic firm decisions (Adhikari, 2016). In
line with this argument, Panel B shows that higher monitoring reduces prod-
uct concerns (column (5)). Moreover, we also find a statistically significant
decrease in the environmental and employee dimensions of CSiR. Overall,
the results are consistent with Table 2, although not all dimensions show
the same significance along the panels. This is not surprising, however, since
this alternative identification strategy affects different types of institutional
investors and use different time periods. This reduces concerns regarding the
external validity of the previous setting. Moreover, the sample size varies in
these tests and, in particular, is much smaller in this second test. Therefore,
the results are not specific to a given time frame, to local average treatment
effect induced by the instrumental variable, or by the definition of monitoring
intensity used in the benchmark results.
The results presented above contradict previous works analyzing the ef-
fect of institutional ownership on CSR in the United States (Johnson and
a short period of time, which is not consistent with benchmarking against an index.
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Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). Overall, previous studies share
similar empirical characteristics, such as the use of a cross-sectional sample.
They do not account for reverse causality or omitted variables, which are
likely to generate biased estimations. These issues may partially account
for the confounding results found in the literature and the differences be-
tween those findings and the results presented in this paper. Nonetheless,
Dyck et al. (2018) provides causal evidence on the opposite effect for non-US
countries.
1.4.2 Alternative proxy for CSR
In this subsection we evaluate our main analysis using Thomson Reuters’
ESG Scores as an alternative CSR measure to MSCI ESG. Thomson Reuters
ESG Scores cover more than 6000 firms globally since 2002. In the US,
the databse covers firms quoted in the Russell 1000.24 Thomson Reuters
gathers public information and company-reported data to calculate industry-
benchmarked percentile based scores on three main pillars: environmental,
social and governance. The database provides an aggregated score for the
three pillars (ESG score) and one with an overlay of ESG controversies (sim-
ilar to MSCI ESG concerns, known as ESG Combined score). The ESG
score is grouped into 10 categories: resource use, emissions, environmen-
tal innovation, workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility,
management, shareholders and CSR strategy. We only make use of the first
seven categories as we do not introduce governance items in our previous
analyses (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Adhikari, 2016). Consistent with
our main measure of CSR we drop the human rights dimension. The first
3 categories fall under the environmental pillar, and the next 4 under the
social one, with the rest belonging to the governance pillar. We create an
aggregated measure of CSR from the social and environmental pillars (E&S),
which is the average score of 6 categories, as well as the individual scores for
each categories under the social and environmental pillars.
We proceed to analyze the impact of instiutional investor distraction on
the level of E&S, resource use, emissions, environmental innovation, work-
force, community, and product responsibility. Table 7 shows the results of
regressing Thomson Reuters ESG scores on institutional investor distraction
24Since Thomson Reuters ESG Scores are only available for firms quoted in the Russell
1000 we cannot apply the alternative empirical strategy that relies on the mechanical
break in insitutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 indexes.
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and a set of controls. In column (1), we report the impact of distraction
on the aggregate measure of social and environmental scores. This impact
is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with our previous
analysis presented in Table 2 Panel A. Institutional investor distraction seems
to have a positive impact on resource use, emissions reduction, workforce and
community, which is also consistent with the evidence provided in Table 2
Panel A. There is a notable effect from Table 7, where institutional investor
distractions appears to lead to lower environmental innovation scores (col-
umn (4)). Inspecting the environmental innovation category more closely, we
document that this dimension relates to the creation of environmental pro-
cesses, technologies and products, which links to the product dimension in
MSCI ESG. We show that the product dimension in MSCI ESG is different
from other dimensions included in our benchmark measure of CSR (MSCI
ESG strengths), as distraction does not lead to increases in such dimen-
sion. We find the same pattern in the product responsibility dimension of
Thomson Reuters ESG scores (Table 7 column (7)), investor distraction does
not lead to significant changes in the product score. Overall, these results
strengthen our claim that institutional investor monitoring matters for CSR,
and that CSR seems to stem from an agency conflict between shareholders
and managers.25
1.4.3 Timing of CSR and CSiR
Previously, we show that when institutional investors are distracted, both
CSR and CSiR increase. However, some concerns might remain regarding
the timing of the dependent variable. In particular, the consequences of
shareholder distraction might arise with some lag, as it may take time until
the actions materialize. Consequently, we might be capturing the effect of
distraction at the beginning of the year. To deal with this issue, some pre-
vious papers measure CSR (and CSiR) in the following year (t + 1) (see for
instance, Adhikari, 2016). In Table 8 we show that the main results of this
paper remain unchanged when we measure CSR and CSiR in the following
25In untabulated results, we study the impact of insitutional investor distraction on CSR
measured through Thomson Reuters ESG scores for subsamples where agency conflicts are
more likely to take place. In a similar fashion to Table 3 Panel A and Table 4 Panel A, we
find that distraction leads to increases in CSR only in subsamples where CEOs’ possess a
large tenure or free cash flows are high.
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year, and in the latter, results are even statistically stronger.26 Moreover,
in untabulated results we find that an exogenous increase in institutional
investor ownership decreases both CSR and CSiR in t + 1, consistent with
the results presented in Table 5.
1.5 Mechanism
There are essentially two mechanisms through which institutional investors
can affect corporate policies: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970).27 The exit
option could be particularly costly when the investor’s stake in the firm is
large, and it is almost unfeasible for index trackers, as leaving a firm would
increase the tracking error. In general, the anecdotal and empirical evidence
from analyses of corporate governance suggests that voice is the preferred
mechanism through which institutional investors communicate their concerns
to management. For instance, Glenn Booraem, principal in Fund Financial
Services and controller of the Vanguard funds, acknowledges his active in-
volvement in hundreds of direct discussions with management every year.
In a recent paper, McCahery et al. (2016) survey institutional investors re-
garding their preferences and actions concerning corporate governance. They
show that institutional investors prefer to use voice over exit and that they
prefer direct engagement with management to voice expressed through share-
holder proposals. In addition, they find that those institutional investors
that behave as active owners are those with a long-term stake in the firm.
Similarly, Hoepner et al. (2016) provide anecdotal evidence of institutional
investors engaging primarily through non-public channels when they target
a company to change environmental, social and governance issues.
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) show that pension funds such
as TIAA-CREF and CalPERS follow a negotiation process with the firms
in which they invest. Typically, they contact managers to request a meet-
ing to reach an agreement before filing or voting on a proposal. Similarly,
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) find that passively managed funds might
26The drop in the number of observations is because we lose one year. As explained in
Section 1.2.2, in 2011 MSCI ESG changed the methodology, and we cannot use that year
in our regressions.
27Some papers suggest that the two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive but can
be used as substitutes (see, for instance, Hirschman, 1970; Edmans and Manso, 2011;
Dasgupta and Piacentino, 2015).
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prefer direct communication with management and use the threat of public
action (through shareholder proposals) as leverage in the negotiation process.
Similarly, Appel et al. (2016) support voice as the mechanism through which
passive investors influence corporate governance. In particular, they find
that ownership by passive funds increases support (the average percentage
of shareholders’ votes) for governance-related shareholder proposals.
The mechanisms through which institutional investors affect CSR and
CSiR have received less attention in the literature. One exception is the paper
by Flammer (2015), in which the author finds that social and environmental
proposals do not receive much support at annual meetings: approximately
75% of them receive less than 20% of votes in favor. She suggests that
these proposals are symbolic in nature and argues that shareholders submit
them to bring social issues to the attention of management and the public.
In addition, shareholder proposals are not binding, that is, even if they were
approved at the annual meeting, this does not mean that management would
implement them.
To asses whether institutional investors exercise voice, we estimate Equa-
tion 1.1 with the dependent variable defined as the number of proposals sub-
mitted at shareholder meetings.28 According to rule 14a-8, proposals need
to be submitted at least 120 calendar days before the proxy statement re-
lease prior to the current annual meeting date. For this reason, and following
Kempf et al. (2017), we averaged the quarterly distraction measure over the
four quarters before the annual meeting. Table 9 presents the results using
the exogenous change in monitoring intensity due to institutional investors
distraction. In the first two columns the dependent variable is the number
of governance proposals submitted at shareholder meetings. Consistent with
Kempf et al. (2017), we find that when institutional investors are distracted,
they submit less governance proposals at annual meetings. However, that is
not the case for social and environmental proposals. Column (3) shows that
the number of this type of proposals submitted by institutional investors in-
creases, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In column
(4) we show that there is no effect for other investors. One can conclude that
institutional investor distraction does not affect the likelihood of submitting
an environmental and social proposal at the shareholder meeting. One po-
tential explanation for this finding is that the type of institution that submits
28Notice that these proposals do not coincide with the dimensions measured by MSCI
ESG and used as proxies for CS(i)R in the previous tests.
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such kind of proposals is not distracted. The types of institutions that sub-
mit social and environmental proposals at shareholder meetings are socially
responsible funds (SRI funds) such as Domini Social Investments, Calvert
Asset Management, and the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility
(ICCR). The objectives of this type of investor may go beyond assuring a
financial return on their investment, and they may also take advantage of
other institutional investor distraction to pursue their own goals. As anec-
dotal evidence we show in Table 9 column (5) that the probability of ICCR
submitting a social and environmental proposal at the annual meeting in-
creases in institutional investors distraction.
We cannot exclude the possibility that some institutional investors seek to
affect social and environmental policies using alternative mechanisms such
as exit and direct communication with management. There is some anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that they might sometimes use these channels.
For instance, in 2006, TIAA-CREF sold more than US$50 million of Coca-
Cola stock due to concerns about CSR issues, after KLD removed the firm
from its Broad Market Social Index. In response, Mr. Preisinger, Assistant
Vice President and Senior Director of Shareholder Affairs, sent a letter to
shareholders in which he acknowledges that they “are in active dialogue with
many of you”. Regarding direct communication, a report on environmental
sustainability proposals argues that firms and investors seek dialog on envi-
ronmental and social issues (EY, 2012). Analyzing tax-planning activities,
Bird and Karolyi (2017) show that institutional investors encourage these
activities, particularly in those firms with higher effective tax rate and lower
governance. They argue that governance activities may involve complex dis-
cussions of tax strategy with management, or identifying unused tax credits,
suggesting that direct communication with management is a potential chan-
nel through which institutional investors shape corporate policies.
1.6 Conclusions
At present, the social and environmental policy of a firm, which spans a wide
range of social and environmental activities, is considered a fundamental part
of corporate management. However, there is not consistent evidence of how
instiutional investor monitoring shape these corporate policies. In this paper,
we provide empirical evidence consistent with institutional investor attention
reducing both CSR and CSiR. Under the assumption that institutional in-
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vestors have the proper incentives and ability to monitor top management,
we find that an increase in institutional investor distraction substantially
increases the probability of improving CSR scores and increases the proba-
bility of suffering from social and environmental controversies that damage
firm value. These results are robust to different measures of monitoring in-
tensity and CSR.
We further investigate settings in which institutional investors act as pure
monitors or as external advisors to top management team. We find that
distraction matters for CSR in setting prone to agency conflicts (high CEO
power and high free cash flows). This is consistent with prior evidence that
CSR is an agency cost (see for instance, Hong et al., 2012; Masulis and
Reza, 2015; Adhikari, 2016). Meanwhile, we give evidence that distraction
matters for CSiR in instances where managerial experience is low (short-
tenured CEO) or the lack of internal advising (low board tenure).
Finally, we show distraction does not seem to affect the number of social
and environmental proposals submitted at shareholder meetings. Addition-
ally, we provide anecdotal evidence that there could be some shareholders
taking advantage of institutional investors distraction to pursue their own
agendas and increase social and environmental proposals.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics
Obs Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75
CSR 9243 1.655 2.43 0.00 1.00 2.00
CSiR 9243 1.738 1.78 1.00 1.00 2.00
Distraction 9243 0.134 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.17
IO 9243 0.750 0.22 0.62 0.78 0.90
Top5-share 9243 0.285 0.10 0.21 0.28 0.34
Firm size 9243 7.870 1.59 6.72 7.67 8.79
ROA 9243 0.141 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.21
BM 9243 0.478 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.61
RD 9243 0.029 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03
Lev 9243 0.218 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.32
Gov S 9243 0.159 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gov C 9243 0.529 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00
SRI Proposals 2077 0.900 1.35 0.00 1.00 1.00
CEO Tenure 6651 7.540 7.19 3.00 5.00 10.00
Board Tenure 8778 9.180 3.62 6.56 8.68 11.22
FCF 8292 0.000 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.05
This table provides sample statistics of the main variables used in the regression analysis.
CSR is the number of strengths that a firm has in a given year. CSiR is the number of con-
cerns that a firm has in a given year. Distraction is the annual average distraction measure
of institutional investors from Kempf et al. (2017), where missing quarterly values have
been replaced by zeros. IO is the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors.
Top5-share is the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholders. Firm size is the
natural logarithm of total assets, and ROA is computed as operating income before depre-
ciation and amortization divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. BM is the
ratio of book-to-market value of equity. RD is expenditures on research and development
normalized by total assets. Lev is leverage defined as the sum of short- and long-term debt
divided by total assets. Gov S and Gov C are the overall MSCI ESG ratings of corporate
governance strengths and concerns, respectively. S&E Proposals is the number of social
and environmental proposals submitted at shareholder meetings. CEO Tenure is the total
number of years during which an individual serves as a CEO. Board Tenure is the total
average number of years during which board members except the CEO serve their role in
the board. FCF is free cash flow calculated as the net cash flow from operations minus
deferred taxes, interest paid, extraordinary items, net change in cash, plus net cash flow
from investment, exchange rate effect, change in short-term debt, and divided by total
assets. All control variables come from Compustat except for CEO Tenure and Board
Tenure that come from Execucomp and BoardEx respectively. All controls are lagged in
regressions and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (cont.)
Panel B: Transition Matrix of CSR
CSR 0 1 2 3 4+ Total
0 85.83 10.76 2.45 0.59 0.37 100
1 13.97 70.18 10.89 2.78 2.18 100
2 6.15 11.28 62.79 12.29 7.49 100
3 2.62 4.12 11.8 57.87 23.6 100
4+ 0.57 1.05 1.24 3.91 93.23 100
Total 38.63 23.14 12.9 7.61 17.72 100
Panel C: Transition Matrix of CSiR
CSiR 0 1 2 3 4+ Total
0 74.5 17.4 6.83 1.03 0.24 100
1 10.84 69.76 15.97 2.57 0.87 100
2 2.97 16.63 63.62 12.41 4.37 100
3 1.74 6.1 15.84 57.27 19.04 100
4+ 0.43 1.49 3.4 9.36 85.32 100
Total 22.38 31.48 20.93 10.45 14.76 100
These panels shows CSR’s (CSiR’s) transition probabilities, after aggregating all
instances of four or more strengths into a single category. Rows indicate the
initial values of CSR (CSiR), and columns indicate final values. The diagonal
values indicate the stickiness of CSR (CSiR). The bottom row indicates the total
probabilities of having from 0 to 4 or more strengths or concerns.
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Table 2: Institutional investor distraction, CSR and CSiR
Panel A: Institutional investor distraction and CSR
CSR Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 14.81 20.04 12.79 16.89 23.54 3.05
(3.83) (2.29) (2.85) (3.32) (3.21) (0.27)
IO 0.08 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.52 -0.59
(0.51) (-0.02) (0.61) (-0.22) (1.88) (-1.21)
Top5-share 0.42 0.73 0.84 -0.38 -0.42 1.27
(1.40) (0.97) (2.51) (-0.84) (-0.87) (1.47)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153
Observations 9243 9243 9243 9243 9243 9243
Panel B: Institutional investor distraction and CSiR
CSiR Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 3.18 8.79 -4.74 1.00 11.98 20.04
(1.30) (1.09) (-1.38) (0.29) (2.01) (3.37)
IO -0.30 -1.00 -0.20 -0.20 -0.46 0.13
(-2.59) (-2.49) (-1.33) (-1.25) (-1.54) (0.45)
Top5-share 0.54 0.98 -0.05 0.53 0.15 1.51
(2.36) (1.22) (-0.15) (1.86) (0.28) (3.24)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153 2153
Observations 9243 9243 9243 9243 9243 9243
This table presents the effect of institutional investor distraction on CSR and CSiR,
as well as their individual dimensions. Panel A shows the impact of institutional
investor distraction on CSR and its individual dimensions. Panel B shows the
impact of institutional investor distraction on CSiR and its individual dimensions.
Controls include firm size, return on assets, leverage, book-to-market, research
and development, governance strengths and concerns. All variables are defined in
Table 1. All regressions include year times industry fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient
estimates.
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Table 5: The impact of monitoring intensity on CSR and CSiR:
alternative empirical strategy
IO QIX CSR CSiR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Russell2000 0.134 0.118
(7.589) (9.535)
IO -2.562 -1.585
(-4.164) (-4.257)
QIX -3.054 -1.855
(-4.297) (-4.366)
Ln MktCap 2.211 1.638 3.435 3.158 0.463 -0.039
(2.972) (3.270) (0.765) (0.698) (0.117) (-0.009)
Ln MktCap2 -0.048 -0.037 -0.078 -0.078 -0.004 0.004
(-2.713) (-3.096) (-0.745) (-0.738) (-0.040) (0.038)
Ln Float -0.078 0.025 0.298 0.582 -0.088 0.096
(-3.833) (1.721) (1.240) (2.999) (-0.904) (1.137)
1st stage 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage
Observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,146 2,146
This table presents the robustness to monitoring intensity. Columns (1) and (2) present
the first-stage estimation of membership in the Russell 2000 and institutional ownership
(IO) and Quasi-Indexer ownership (QIX), respectively, plus market capitalization poly-
nomials and float controls. IO is the overall level of institutional ownership, while QIX
are Quasi-Indexer investors (Bushee, 1998, 2001), which are more likely to be affected by
the instrument. Russell2000 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the
top positions of the Russell 2000. Ln MktCap and Ln Float are the natural logarithm
of market capitalization and float provided by Russell, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. Columns (3) and (4) report the second-stage estimation for the
level of institutional and Quasi-Indexer ownership on CSR, respectively. Columns (5) and
(6) present the second-stage estimation for the level of institutional and Quasi-Indexer
ownership on CSiR, respectively. In columns (3) to (6) we use bootstrapped standard
errors to account for possible prediction error in the first-stage estimation of institutional
(and Quasi-Indexer) ownership. All regressions include year fixed effects. t-statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 6: Dimensions of CSR and CSiR
Panel A: Institutional investor ownership and CSR dimensions
Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QIX -5.840 -3.352 -1.883 -0.853 -3.548
(-2.925) (-4.939) (-1.725) (-0.362) (-1.274)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835
Panel B: Institutional investor ownership and CSiR dimensions
Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QIX -1.354 -0.644 -0.999 -3.689 -5.305
(-0.797) (-1.088) (-1.658) (-3.047) (-5.070)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835
These tables report the second-stage estimation for the predicted level of in-
stitutional on CSR (Panel A) and CSiR (Panel B) for the different dimensions
of the constructs: community, diversity, employee relations, environment and
product. All regressions include year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported
below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 7: Alternative measure of CSR
E&S Res Use Emi Red Env Inn Work Comm Prod Res
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distraction 2.112 3.874 3.900 -2.319 3.437 2.759 1.020
(2.286) (2.699) (2.734) (-1.717) (2.109) (2.124) (0.748)
IO 0.081 0.088 0.108 0.014 0.080 0.032 0.163
(2.034) (1.489) (1.892) (0.247) (1.136) (0.542) (2.596)
Top5-share -0.194 -0.209 -0.211 -0.252 -0.130 -0.105 -0.256
(-2.848) (-2.033) (-2.093) (-2.615) (-1.048) (-1.070) (-2.094)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660
This table presents the impact of institutional investor distraction on alternative measures
of CSR. In column (1), the dependent variable is the Thomson Reuters ESG Score for the
environmental and social dimensions, which does not include the governance dimension.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) are the categories within the environmental dimension . These
are Resource Use (column (2)), Emission Reduction score (column (3)), and environmen-
tal innovation (column (4)). Columns (5), (6), and (7) belong to the social dimension.
These are Workforce (columns (5)), Community (column (6)), and Product Responsibility
(column (7)). E&S is the defined as the aggregate score of the 6 environmental and social
dimensions reported by Thomson Reuters ESG database (previously known as ASSET4).
Resource Use (Res Use) is defined as the performance of firms to reduce the use of energy,
water or materials. Emission Reduction (Emi Red) is defined as firms’ environmental
commitment and effectiveness to reduce their emissions in production and operational
processes. Environmental Innovation (Env Inn) is defined as creating new environmental
technologies, processes, and products. Workforce (Work) is defined as firms’ effectiveness
towards job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal
opportunities, and development opportunities for its workforce. Community (Comm) is
defined as firms’ commitment towards being a good citizen, protecting public health and
respecting business ethics. Product Responsibility (Prod Res) is defined as firms’ capac-
ity to produce quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health and safety,
integrity and data privacy. All these definitions are obtained from Thomson Reuters ESG
Scores methodology manual from November 2017. All regressions include industry times
year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 8: Robustness to timing of CSR and CSiR
Panel A: CSR and its dimensions in t+ 1
CSR Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 14.028 23.427 13.930 12.218 19.704 11.482
(4.143) (2.912) (3.275) (2.376) (3.283) (0.960)
IO 0.116 0.100 0.216 -0.030 0.348 -0.483
(0.715) (0.254) (1.051) (-0.117) (1.246) (-0.958)
Top5-share 0.437 0.506 0.807 -0.424 0.018 1.325
(1.416) (0.677) (2.292) (-0.889) (0.036) (1.496)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465
Panel B: CSiR and its dimensions in t+ 1
CSiR Community Diversity Employee Environment Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 4.909 8.290 -2.815 -4.100 13.447 21.047
(1.992) (1.072) (-0.818) (-1.161) (2.199) (3.685)
IO -0.240 -0.831 -0.173 -0.179 -0.385 0.307
(-1.950) (-1.921) (-1.091) (-1.033) (-1.191) (1.057)
Top5-share 0.431 0.762 0.003 0.478 -0.071 1.203
(1.830) (0.880) (0.009) (1.523) (-0.126) (2.477)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,465
These tables present the effect of shareholder distraction on CSR (Panel A) and CSiR
(Panel B) for the total scores (column 1) and the different dimensions of the constructs in
t+ 1: community, diversity, employee relations, environment and product (columns (2) to
(6), respectively). The rest of the variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include
firm-specific controls and year times industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 9: Shareholder social and environmental proposals
Gov Proposals S&E Proposals
Institutions Other Institutions Other ICCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distraction -3.482 -0.999 1.652 -2.425 9.506
(-2.542) (-0.991) (1.379) (-1.193) (1.776)
IO 0.499 -0.444 -0.110 -1.564 -2.816
(1.329) (-0.925) (-0.328) (-2.339) (-2.216)
Top5 -0.337 1.661 -1.084 1.631 -0.650
(-0.541) (2.309) (-1.607) (1.247) (-0.282)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,026 2,026 2,026 2,026 477
This table explores whether institutional investors use social and environmental propos-
als to shape CS(i)R policies. Columns (1) and (2) present the results of the impact of
shareholder distraction on the number of governance proposals submitted at shareholder
meetings by institutional investors and other shareholders, respectively. In columns (3)
and (4) we show the results of the effect of shareholder distraction and the number of social
and environmental proposals submitted at shareholder meetings by institutional investors
and other shareholders, respectively. Finally, in column (5) we show the probability of
submitting a social and environmental proposal by ICCR when institutional investors are
distracted. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are reported
below the coefficient estimates.
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Chapter 2
The bright side of stock
repurchases
2.1 Introduction
American firms spend several millions of dollars in stock repurchases each quarter:
between 2005 and 2014, S&P 500 firms distributed more than $3.95 trillion US dol-
lars using this method (Fried and Wang, 2017), drawing criticism from politicians
and academics. Hillary Clinton has claimed that firms are using too much money
to repurchase shares and that they are nearly out of funds to “build a new factory
or research lab, or to train workers, or to give them a raise.”1 Lazonick (2014)
and Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016) also made similar claims. Almeida, Fos, and
Kronlund (2016) conclude that managers are willing to shift away investment and
employment towards stock repurchases that allow them to meet analysts’ earnings
per share (EPS) targets.2 In contrast to this negative wave of opinion against
repurchases,3 in this paper I present evidence of actual repurchases increasing in-
1“Stocks buybacks draw scrutiny from politicians”. The New York Times, August 10,
2015.
2In a previous paper, Bens, Nagar, and Wong (2002) make a similar argument analyzing
the extensive use of employee stock options that induces firms to repurchase shares to avoid
dilution of the EPS ratio when the options are exercised.
3This negative view is not fully justified as it is based on partial and misleading anal-
yses that ignore the fact that investors can reinvest the cash in other firms that might
have better investment opportunities (Edmans, 2017) or that in the presence of a global
reduction in growth opportunities, firms will simultaneously increase stock repurchases
and reduce investment which results in a positive correlation between repurchases and
investment (Grullon and Michaely, 2004).
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vestment in firms that suffer the most from asymmetric information and rely on
external finance. This positive effect of stock repurchases on investment is consis-
tent with a theory of firms using this payout form as a signal that allows them to
access capital markets later in better terms.
It is well established that in the presence of informational asymmetries and no
information transfer, market value must reflect the average firm quality (Akerlof,
1970; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ofer and Thakor, 1987), meaning that good (bad)
firms will be undervalued (overvalued). The credibility of actual repurchases as a
signal comes from the fact that for bad firms repurchasing shares is too costly, as
long-term investors would be diluted if manager engage in that kind of transaction.
To the contrary, good-firm insiders benefit from actual repurchases when the firm
is undervalued (Fried, 2014, 2015), what allows for a separating equilibrium.4 The
existence of informed shareholders with a long-term horizon seems a reasonable as-
sumption in the average American publicly traded firm, for which Perez-Gonzalez
(2002) and Holderness (2009) document high insider ownership.5 In this signaling
context, stock repurchases are expected to increase investment in firms suffering
the most from asymmetric information, as that would allow them to convey their
type to capital providers. The empirical results are consistent with this argument.
In particular, the estimates indicate that for a typical increase in market-based
asymmetric information, a one-standard-deviation increase in stock repurchases
boosts investment by 10% (relative to the mean). However, stock repurchases are
only expected to affect investment in those firms that rely on external capital mar-
kets to finance investment and, therefore, need to signal their type. Indeed, when
I sort firms into external finance dependent (EFD) and those that are not reliant
on external finance (No EFD), I find that the results are driven by the former.6
Moreover, the effect is statistically equal to zero in the latter. In additional tests,
I show that the results are not driven by firms simultaneously signaling through
insider purchases or dividends.
To further support the causal interpretation of the results, I instrument re-
purchases using the exogenous price pressure created by distressed mutual funds
(Coval and Stafford, 2007; Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim, 2012; Edmans, Goldstein,
and Jiang, 2012). Coval and Stafford (2007) analyze the effect of forced sales by
distressed mutual funds on equity markets and show that sales concentrated in a
4In Appendix A I provide the simplest model specification for which this result holds.
5Perez-Gonzalez (2002) reports that large individual shareholders hold 25% of the out-
standing shares of the firms they participated in, while Holderness (2009) finds that 96%
of US firms have blockholders, which own 39% in aggregate of the mean firm.
6EFDs are those firms that expect to have at least two quarters with financing deficits
in the following year, where the quarterly financing deficit is estimated as in Frank and
Goyal (2003).
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limited number of securities significantly affect stock prices, resulting in transac-
tion prices that deviate from fundamental values. The authors document ex post
price reversals, which are inconsistent with information-based trading. In the same
vein, Khan et al. (2012) use mutual fund flows to identify overvalued equity, and
they find abnormal return reversion for (exogenously) overvalued stocks. Similarly,
Edmans et al. (2012) construct a measure of undervaluation based on hypothetical
trades and arrive at similar results. These papers show that this type of misvalua-
tion is unrelated to firms’ prospects, providing support for the exclusion restriction
required by the instrumental variables approach.
In the first-stage estimation, I show that firms suffering from exogenous price
pressures from distressed mutual funds are more likely to repurchase shares and,
on average, increase repurchases relative to shares outstanding by 13.6%. Fur-
thermore, I find that managers privately identify exogenous undervaluation and
time insider purchases to exploit mispricing, a result consistent with Ali, Wei, and
Zhou (2011) and Khan et al. (2012). In the second-stage estimation, I first show
that stock repurchases motivated by mutual funds’ fire sales neither increase nor
decrease investment on average.7 I further instrument the interaction between
stock repurchases and information asymmetry, and the results confirm the panel
fixed-effect results: stock repurchases increase investment, particularly in firms
with higher information asymmetry, and the results are driven by EFD firms. In
additional tests, I replace the firm-level variable for asymmetric information with
the VIX index, which proxies for aggregate volatility in firms’ market value (Kim
and Kung, 2017).8 The results hold, and in general are stronger, under the alter-
native proxy for asymmetric information, and this suggests that the market finds
the signal more useful when overall uncertainty over firms’ value is higher.
I also analyze the effect of stock repurchases on financing policies. On the
one hand, if EFD firms repurchase shares to signal their type, they should be
raising external financing in the following period. I find that stock repurchases
are followed by debt issuance in the EFD subsample (but not for cash-rich firms).
Moreover, I do not find changes in cash holding, thus reducing concerns that the
firms with excess cash are the ones repurchasing shares and increasing investment.
Regarding equity issuance, the results are inconclusive, but in general, I find no
7Importantly, the instrument used in this paper treats firms that are similar in observ-
ables to the average repurchaser in the population. Some recent papers have questioned
whether instrumental variables have been useful in increasing the understanding of the
causal effects, as the local effect identified by the instrument can be unrepresentative of
the population treatment effect (Jiang, 2017).
8The validity of the instrument for the interaction (Rep*IA) relies on the assumption
that Rep is the only endogenous variable in the model. This assumption is more likely
true for the VIX, which is exogenous to individual firms.
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significant changes in this source of financing. However, the results should be inter-
preted with caution because the instrument is very likely to violate the exclusion
restriction for financing policies and, in particular, for equity issuance. Fire sales
by distressed mutual funds depress stock prices, making it costlier for firms to raise
funds through equity issuance. Interestingly, while Almeida et al. (2016) find that
managers finance EPS-motivated repurchases with investment cuts and reductions
in cash holdings, stock repurchases induced by exogenous price pressures increase
debt issuance without changing the average cash holdings.
Finally, stock repurchases should allow good firms to borrow at a lower cost
of capital if they can actually convey information to borrowers and investors. Us-
ing data on new debt issuance I document a negative association between stock
repurchases and the at-issue yield spread on new debt issuance. Moreover, the
association is increasing in asymmetric information. In addition, I find that firms
that repurchase shares before seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) experience lower
discounts in the [0,1] window around the announcement, which is consistent with
Billett and Xue (2007) and Bond and Zhong (2016). The effect is stronger for
firms that suffer the most from adverse selection, which is in line with the mech-
anism proposed in this paper. Similar to Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2014),
the results suggest that the market uses the information contained in repurchase
activity.
In additional tests I analyze how the results change when I test the prediction
in the subsample of firms in which managers or long-term insiders hold a signifi-
cant fraction of the outstanding shares. I show that the results are stronger when
I drop firms with negligible managerial ownership, or when firms are less likely to
have informed (and long-term oriented) investors, as expected. Moreover, I an-
alyze whether firms with short-term incentives contaminate the results, creating
a downward bias of the estimates. The results are economically and statistically
stronger when I drop firm-quarter in which firms are close to the zero EPS thresh-
old. The latter results suggest that the firms that trade-off investment for stock
repurchases that allow them to beat analysts forecasts (Almeida et al., 2016) are
different from the firms using repurchases as a signaling tool.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several directions. First,
I contribute to the payout policy literature providing a new motive for actual
repurchases, with distinct implications for investment. In a world with perfect
capital markets, the value of the firm is independent of the financial structure
and payout policy (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961);
therefore, repurchases should not affect investment. The traditional theories that
explain payout policies are generally grouped according to the frictions in (i) taxes
(e.g., Miller and Scholes, 1978), (ii) agency problems (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984;
Jensen, 1986), and (iii) asymmetric information (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and
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Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Constantinides
and Grundy, 1989; Oded, 2005; Bhattacharya and Jacobsen, 2016).9 I contribute
to this vast literature arguing that repurchase may play an important signaling
role that results in improved firms investment.
On the other hand, this paper contributes to the current debate on the real ef-
fect of stock repurchases. The extensive literature on payout policy in general and
stock buybacks in particular (see Allen and Michaely, 2003; Farre-Mensa, Michaely,
and Schmalz, 2014, for a comprehensive review), has generally left the real effects
unaddressed, and if anything, it provides evidence of a negative association be-
tween stock repurchases and real outcomes (Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Bens
et al., 2002), or a negative causal impact (Almeida et al., 2016). To the contrary, I
provide causal evidence that repurchases increase investment, particularly in firms
suffering from high information asymmetry, while I find no statistically significant
effect on firms that suffer the least from this problem. Taken together, these results
talk to the heterogeneity of stock repurchases, and have straightforward regulatory
implications: banning stock repurchases would harm firms that use them to signal
their type, while it would have beneficial effects for firms more likely to oppor-
tunistically use stock repurchases to meet market expectations. Consequently, a
deeper understanding of the motivations for and real effects of stock repurchases
is needed to weigh the pros and cons of this policy and determine its social cost.
Finally, this paper also adds to the recent literature suggesting that financing,
payout, and investing decisions have to be analyzed in a unified framework (Bond
and Zhong, 2016; Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz, 2017). In a Myers and
Majluf (1984) setting, stock repurchases would only make sense for firms with
excess cash and without investment opportunities. However, Fama and French
(2005) find that many firms with financing deficits repurchase shares. Similarly,
Farre-Mensa et al. (2017) provide evidence of firms systematically using debt and
equity to finance payouts. They find that approximately one-third of the aggregate
capital paid out by American public firms is raised from the same payers during
the same year via debt or equity issuance. Similar to Bond and Zhong (2016),
this paper provides a rationale for why firms with financial deficit might engage in
stock repurchases, violating the pecking order hypothesis.
9More recently, the literature provides alternative motives for payout in general and
share repurchases in particular. These alternative explanations include managers repur-
chasing shares to increase EPS targets that affect their compensation (Hribar, Jenkins, and
Johnson, 2006; Ben-Rephael et al., 2014; Almeida et al., 2016), to improve market liquidity
(Hillert, Maug, and Obernberger, 2016), price informativeness (Busch and Obernberger,
2017), undervaluation and market timing (Ben-Rephael et al., 2014; Dittmar and Field,
2015), among other motives.
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2.2 Hypothesis Development
The difficulty of distinguishing good from bad firms is inherent to capital markets.
In the absence of a credible way of conveying information to actual and future
stakeholders, good and bad firms will be traded at the average (or cross-sectional)
value (Akerlof, 1970; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ofer and Thakor, 1987).10 In other
words, the good firm would be undervalued, while the bad one will be overvalued.
Undervaluation could be problematic for firms that need to access external capital
markets to finance investment projects, because it means that in the absence of
a signal, they have to borrow at a higher cost of capital. In this setting, actual
repurchases can convey information to capital providers. The general argument
is that good firms could repurchase shares to signal their type because bad firms
will find it too costly to mimic. The reason is that, when they repurchase ex-
pensive shares, the stake of non-selling shareholders is diluted.11 Consequently, if
the manager interests are aligned to those of long-term shareholders, only good
firms would repurchase shares in equilibrium. Moreover, where substantial asym-
metric information exists and where the fraction of lemons is high relative to the
proportion of good firms, markets might fail to exist (Akerlof, 1970; Leland and
Pyle, 1977). Consequently, my first prediction is that actual repurchases should
disproportionately help firms that suffer the most from adverse selection.12
Previous papers have suggested that stock repurchases can be used to signal
firm type (e.g, Miller and Rock, 1985; Ofer and Thakor, 1987). What is different
here is that I show that actual repurchases can lead to an increase rather than a
decrease in investment. However, this will only be the case if firms need to access
external capital markets to finance the projects. To put it differently, asymmetric
information should not affect investment decisions if the firm already has the funds
to finance profitable projects, and therefore, no systematic relationship between
these variables is expected for cash rich firms. Then, the positive effect of actual
repurchases on real outcomes is expected only for external finance dependent firms.
Finally, notice that a key assumption behind the mechanism is that man-
agers have a stake in the firm, or that their interests are aligned to non-selling
(long-term) shareholders. This seems reasonable in the average American publicly
traded firm, for which Holderness (2009) documents high insider ownership. As
in Leland and Pyle (1977), managers actions speak louder than words, and repur-
chasing shares when they have skin in the game, would signal that the firm is good
10That is, the weighted average of good and bad firms’ market price under perfect
information.
11Oded (2005) uses a similar mechanism to show that only good firms announce a
repurchase program in equilibrium.
12In Appendix A I provide a very simple model to illustrate this idea.
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(and it is undervalued) because they would otherwise be bearing the dilution costs
themselves. Alternatively, if (informed) long-term investors hold a significant frac-
tion of total shares outstanding, they would prevent managers from repurchasing
overvalued shares, adding credibility to the signaling mechanism. To sum up, the
results are expected to be stronger when managers or other informed investor own
a sufficiently large portion of the firm.
2.3 Sample and Data
2.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample period covers 11 years, from 2004 to 2014. In 2003, the SEC in-
creased the disclosure requirements for open market repurchases. In particular,
since March 2004, firms have been required to report the total number of shares
repurchased and the share price on a monthly basis on Form 10-Q and Form 10-K
(Item 2(e) and Item 5(c), respectively). Therefore, to reduce measurement error
in open market repurchases, I analyze the period from 2004 to 2014 for public
firms incorporated in the United States. The main databases are Compustat for
financial information and CRSP for stock returns. Following previous literature,
I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and
quasi-governmental and nonprofit firms (SIC 9000-9999). In addition, I exclude
foreign private issuers because they do not have the same filing requirements,
firm-quarters with a negative or missing value of assets and a market price below
1.
In Section 2.4.2, I address endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach.
I collect data on mutual funds’ holdings, returns and total net assets from the
Thomson Reuters and CRSP Mutual Fund databases. In 2004, the SEC increased
the disclosure frequency for mutual funds, from a semiannual to a quarterly basis.
This meant an increase in the availability of information to estimate the proxy for
downward price pressure.13
To test the main hypothesis, I need to identify EFD firms. I follow Frank
and Goyal (2003) in creating the financing deficit variable, based on cash flow
statement data. I drop some firms that do not report quarterly data to construct
that main proxy.14 Finally, the data for all variables are winsorized at the first
13Prior to 2004, many mutual funds voluntarily disclosed their holdings on a quarterly
basis.
14The results are qualitatively similar when I keep those firms, but the estimations are
noisier. The list of excluded firms and the results when including them are available upon
request.
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and ninty-ninth percentile.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main firm-level variables used
in this paper (see Appendix B for a detailed description of their construction).
The average firm repurchases shares in more than one-third of the quarters, and it
spends 58 million US dollars on buybacks quarterly (conditional on Repurchases>0).
This represents 1.6% of total assets and 1.1% of total shares outstanding. The av-
erage firm invests 1.3% of total assets in capital expenditures, 1.5% in R&D quar-
terly (and 2.7% in the sum of both). The mean firm has a market capitalization of
4.3 billion dollars. Institutional investors (mutual funds) account for 62% (20.5%)
of total shares outstanding. These values are consistent with previous literature
(Ben-Rephael et al., 2014; Almeida et al., 2016). In untabulated results, I find
that firms that repurchase shares are significantly larger, more profitable, have
higher cash flows, and pay more dividends than non-repurchasers. They also have
higher institutional and mutual fund ownership. Importantly, repurchasers have
lower investment opportunities, proxied by Tobin’s Q, which could simultaneously
increase stock repurchases and reduce investment (Grullon and Michaely, 2004) in
the absence of a research design that addresses endogeneity.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Panel regression
Panel regression methodology
In the main specification, I regress the change in investment in the following year
on stock repurchases and the interaction with asymmetric information. Follow-
ing Almeida et al. (2016), the dependent variables are measured as the difference
between the mean investment in the following four quarters (relative to repur-
chases) compared with the mean of the previous four quarters, and the difference
is normalized by total assets:
4Investmentit = α1Repit+β1Repit ∗AIit+ δ1AIit+γ1Xit−1 +ηi+θt+ it, (2.1)
where Investmentit is either capital expenditures (CAPEX) or the sum of capital
expenditures and research and development expenses (CAPEX + RD) (Baker,
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Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Grullon and Michaely, 2004).15 Repurchasesit is the
quarterly number of shares repurchased, normalized by total shares outstanding
at the beginning of the quarter. Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) my main
proxy for asymmetric information is based on the bid ask spread normalized by
the stock price. In particular, AIit is a ranked variable based on the average
quintile-ranked measure of the by the bid-ask spread, that varies from 0 (low) to 1
(high information asymmetry).16 In line with the investment literature, I control
for potential correlation with the firm’s investment opportunities, measured by
Tobin’s Q and operating free cash flow (Baker et al., 2003; Rauh, 2006; Almeida
et al., 2016; Kim and Kung, 2017). In the baseline tests, I also consider firm size,
past returns (Hau and Lai, 2013), and leverage. All the controls are included in
the control matrix, Xit−1, and they are measured as of the beginning-of-year t. θt
are quarter-year fixed effects, and ηi are firm fixed effects.
The main coefficient of interest is β1, and I expect it to be positive. According
to the main prediction, firms facing high asymmetric information benefit the most
from signaling because doing nothing would imply substantial cross-subsidization
or market breakdown. In addition, I will analyze the average effect of stock re-
purchases, α1 (excluding the interaction term and the proxy for asymmetric in-
formation), for which previous literature finds a negative association (Grullon and
Michaely, 2004). I will show that this result vanishes after addressing endogeneity
concerns.
The positive effect of stock repurchases on investment hypothesized in Section
2.2 does not necessarily hold for the average firm. If anything, the effect should
be observed for firms that rely on capital markets to finance investment projects.
Frank and Goyal (2003) document that external finance is much more frequent
than is often recognized, and in many cases, it exceeds investment. I follow the
authors in the construction of the financing deficit variable, from the cash flow
identity:
DEFit = DIVit + Iit +4WCit − Cit,
where DIVit represents cash dividends, Iit is net investment, 4WCit is the change
in working capital, and Cit is cash flow after interest and taxes. Then, I define
a firm to be EFD if DEFit is positive in at least two quarters in the following
15In what follows, all the dependent variables are in changes and identified using up-
percase letters. The only exceptions are the cost of debt and equity analyzed in Section
2.5.2.
16I use a ranked variable to reduce measurement error and the effect of outliers. In
addition, in Section 2.4.3, I use an alternative definition of asymmetric information, and
using a ranked variable eases comparison.
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year.17 Notice that timing matters here. In particular, the repurchase activity
is only disclosed in the 10-Q and 10-K filings, with deadlines 40-45 and 60-90
days after the quarter end, respectively. Therefore, contemporaneous repurchases
would not be useful as a signal if the firm will eventually need to issue equity or
debt to finance investment projects. The implicit assumption is that managers
can anticipate that they will need to raise funds externally. I will show in the next
section that the proxy provides a good sorting for firms that is consistent with
Baker et al. (2003).
Panel regression results
Table 2 presents the association between stock repurchases and changes in in-
vestment. In Panel A, the dependent variable is CAPEX, while in Panel B, it is
CAPEX + RD. Columns (1) and (2) provide evidence of a negative association
between stock repurchases and changes in investment in the following year. In
the first column, I control for growth opportunities (Q) and cash flow (CF) as
in Almeida et al. (2016), while in the second column, I additionally control for
firm size (Size), past return (Return) and leverage (Lev). I find a negative and
statistically insignificant association in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A.18 The re-
lationship is stronger under the alternative definition of investment that includes
research and development expenses. However, even after controlling for unobserv-
able (time-invariant) firm characteristics, there might be some endogeneity issues.
For instance, Grullon and Michaely (2004) argue that mature firms without good
investment prospects simultaneously increase stock repurchases and cut invest-
ment. Indeed, using an instrumental variable approach, I will show in Section
2.4.2 that this seems to be the case.
Before moving to the exogenous variation in stock repurchases, I will make
progress on causality by focusing on the theoretical mechanism through which
stock repurchases would increase investment. In particular, stock repurchases can
help overcome problems of adverse selection because they might be used to signal
firm type, thereby reducing the cost of external funds. Thus, stock repurchases
17This is in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and, to some extent, Baker et al.
(2003). However, Rajan and Zingales use US industry data to define industry dependence
on external finance around the world. Baker et al. (2003) use the Kaplan and Zingales
index to define equity-dependent firms only. This index is not appropriate in the current
setting because firms could also raise debt to finance a project.
18The results in Almeida et al. (2016) are both economically and statistically larger.
The most likely explanation for the difference is that the authors do not include firm fixed
effects in their estimation. In untabulated results, I find a similar coefficient and t-statistic
after removing them. Moreover, they consider a different sample period and an alternative
definition of stock repurchases.
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should help firms that are severely affected by asymmetric information (and need
to raise external funds to finance profitable projects), i.e., the interaction term
(Rep*AI) is expected to be positive.19 Consistent with the previous argument, I
find a positive and statistically significant coefficient under alternative definitions
of investment (column (3)). Regarding the economic significance, this estimates
implies that for a typical deviation of the asymmetric information variable, a one-
standard-deviation increase in stock repurchases increases capital expenditures by
10.7% (relative to the mean) in the following year.
Consider next the case of a cash-rich firm that has enough money to finance
the investment project. The good firm’s manager could still benefit from bargain
repurchases (with excess cash) without a corresponding change in investment. In
other words, signaling is irrelevant from the cash-rich firm’s perspective because
investment can be financed in any case. These are the firms that are defined as
No EFD, and the results for this subsample are presented in column (4). The
interaction Rep*AI is statistically indistinguishable from zero, regardless of the
proxy for investment considered. On the contrary, in the case of EFD firms, actual
repurchases play a role, particularly when asymmetric information is high. The
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover,
the interactions in both subsamples are statistically different (the t-statistics of
the differences are 2.9 for CAPEX and 3.5 for CAPEX+RD).
Baker et al. (2003) find that equity-dependent firms exhibit a more positive
sensitivity of investment to prices (Tobin’s Q) and cash flow than No EFD firms.
Using the alternative definition of dependence on external financing explained
above, I find that the coefficients for CF, Q and Return are statistically different
in both subsamples and larger in the EFD group,20 thereby providing support for
the classification used to sort firms. Note that there is a negative relationship
between asymmetric information and investment, consistent with Kim and Kung
(2017). More important, this variable more severely affects firms that rely on
external finance (the t-statistics of the differences are 3.0 and 2.3 for CAPEX and
CAPEX+RD, respectively). The rest of the control variables have the expected
signs: investment is negatively associated with firm size and leverage.
Managers could simultaneously profit from private information through insider
19The disclosure environment for publicly traded firms in the United States is relatively
rich (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), and therefore, the effect is not expected to be found for
the average firm that might already have other ways of conveying information to market
participants.
20The t-statistics of the difference for CF are 3.6 and 4.5 for CAPEX and CAPEX+RD,
respectively. The coefficients on Tobin’s Q in Panel A are not statistically different from
one another, but they are in Panel B (t-statistic=3.6). The difference is also significant
for Return, with t-statistics of 3.4 and 3.2 in Panels A and B, respectively.
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purchases and actual repurchases. The signaling power of insider purchases would
arguably be stronger because, on the one hand, they are a relatively rare event
(compared to stock repurchases). On the other hand, firm insiders are already
highly exposed to firm risk, as they also have their personal capital invested in the
firm. Moreover, insider trading disclosure is timelier than information about open
market repurchases (Fried, 2014), therefore the market could learn the firm’s type
even before repurchase activity is disclosed, and there would be no place for stock
repurchases as a signal. In Table 3, I check whether insider purchases are driving
the result. In particular, I estimate the regressions when excluding firm-quarters
with positive insider purchases. The coefficients are economically and statistically
indistinguishable from the benchmark results (see Table 2). While a lower effect
would be expected after excluding these firm-quarters, the results remain highly
significant, suggesting that the findings are not driven by insiders signaling using
their own wealth. Moreover, it seems that direct and indirect insider trading would
be used differently (see Mar´ın and Sureda-Gomila (2006) and Section 2.4.2 below),
and that could partially explain why the coefficients do not vary substantially.
2.4.2 Instrumental variable approach
Instrumental variable methodology
Previous studies find that stock repurchases are negatively associated with invest-
ment. An omitted variable could be at least partly responsible for this negative
relationship because as firms mature and lose profitable investment opportunities,
they might choose to distribute cash to shareholders (Grullon and Michaely, 2004).
In other words, endogeneity would induce a downward bias of the estimates. To
address this concern, I use an instrumental variables approach. In particular, I
instrument actual repurchases with exogenous price pressures in stock prices due
to fire sales by distressed mutual funds. The first-stage estimation is the following:
Repurchasesit = α0DPPit+β0DPPit∗AIit+δ0AIit+γ0Xit−1 +ηi+θt+uit, (2.2)
where Repurchasesit, AIit and Xit−1, are defined as above, and the instrument,
DPPit, is the dummy variable for price pressure. Similar proxies for price pressures
have been previously used in the literature (see, for instance, Coval and Stafford,
2007; Khan et al., 2012; Edmans et al., 2012). Building on these papers, I construct
the variable as follows. I first estimate quarterly mutual fund flows based on total
net assets and mutual fund returns21 and define as “distressed” those mutual
funds with flows in the top and bottom deciles of the distribution of flows. That
21In particular, the measure is as follows: MFFj,t = (TNAj,t − TNAj,t−1(1 +
Rj,t−1))/TNAj,t−1, where TNA is total net assets, and R is fund j’s return.
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is, extreme inflows (outflows) are those in the top (bottom) decile. Then, for each
stock, I sum all purchases by mutual funds with extreme inflows and subtract
mutual funds sales with extreme outflows, both at the quarter level. Finally, the
dummy variable DPPit is equal to 1 if the difference between inflows and outflows
(normalized by the trading volume) for a firm in a given quarter is smaller than
-50% of the firm’s trading volume (see Appendix C for further details). At this
point, I differ from previous papers that regard as undervalued those stocks in the
first decile of the distribution. The reason is that, by taking the lowest decile,
I force 10% of the firms to be undervalued in each quarter, while that is not
necessarily the case.22
The economic rationale for the instrument is the following: when investors
that own shares in a mutual fund want to redeem their positions, fund managers
will first attempt to use cash holdings to meet redemptions. When cash holdings
are insufficient, they have to sell part of the portfolio of shares because regulations
and self-imposed constraints prevent them from short-selling other assets to raise
funds (Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman, 2004; Coval and Stafford, 2007).
Distressed mutual funds (those with outflows exceeding their cash holdings) will
create price pressure in the stocks that they are selling, and the effect is substantial
when fire sales are concentrated in a limited number of securities (whenever there
are no mutual funds with extreme inflows fire-purchasing those assets). These
create temporary misvaluations, and trading against distressed mutual funds gen-
erates positive abnormal returns. In particular, fire sales create opportunities for
firms to buy back cheap shares and will therefore increase the probability and
amount of share repurchases.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of mutual funds’ characteristics and trad-
ing behavior in response to investors’ redemptions. Funds are sorted into deciles,
based on quarterly flows, where the first (last) row shows funds with the largest
outflows (inflows). Several interesting characteristics arise from the table. First,
there is substantial variation in quarterly mutual fund flows (column (2)). Funds
in the lowest decile lose on average 18% of their assets in a given quarter, while
funds in the highest receive 35%. Funds in extreme deciles are significantly smaller
in terms of total net assets (and, to some extent, the number of holdings) than
mutual funds around the median flow deciles (columns (4) and (5)). Importantly,
mutual funds with extreme inflows expand 57% of their positions (column (8)),
while their counterparts with extreme outflows reduce 47% of positions (column
(9)). Even when the former eliminate fewer positions than the latter (column
(10)), the figures are not significantly different (nor do they show differences in
22The results are qualitatively similar using Coval and Stafford (2007) definition, but
the first stage is weaker, particularly for the EFD subsample. The same holds when I
consider alternative thresholds (different from the 50%) in the definition of DPPit.
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the fraction of new positions, column (6)). Their trading behavior seems consistent
with mutual funds following an investment strategy and maintaining it even when
they are distressed. These results provide support for the exclusion restriction,
showing that, on average, mutual funds with extreme outflows (inflows), sell (buy)
according to their specific investment strategy, without significantly changing their
portfolios.23 Moreover, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that funds experiencing
extreme flows do not trade with any greater frequency in larger, more liquid, or
better-performing holdings than funds with intermediate flows.
Stocks with downward price pressure, DPP = 1, experience negative abnormal
returns around the quarter in which mutual funds are heavily selling. However, this
effect reverses after some months, which is consistent with the argument that these
fire sales are unrelated to firms’ prospects. Figure 1, Panel A shows that firms with
downward price pressure have negative abnormal returns in the months around the
event, measured as stock return in excess of the Carhart four-factor model. The
event quarter comprises months -2 to 0.24 The mean abnormal returns are negative
and statistically significant from -5 to -1, and they become positive after the event
(but they are only statistically significant in some months). Panel B of Figure 1
presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all firms suffering from price
pressure. The pattern is similar to that presented in Coval and Stafford (2007)
and Edmans et al. (2012). Note, however, that for the sample period considered in
this paper, the duration of the mispricing is shorter, as is the negative abnormal
return. This is consistent with investors learning and dissipating the mispricing
following academic publications (McLean and Pontiff, 2016). Finally, Panel C
shows the CARs for firms that repurchase shares in the event quarter (dashed line)
and firms that do not (solid line). While repurchasing firms seem to revert their
negative CAR faster, the differences in unconditional means are not statistically
significant. Both panels show that misvaluations created by distressed mutual
funds are temporary and that CARs become statistically indistinguishable from
zero after some months.
To further support the exclusion restriction, Table 5 depicts the pre-existing
differences in the investment variables between firms that suffer from exogenous
price pressures and firms that do not. In particular, I regress the lagged levels
of and changes in CAPEX and CAPEX + RD, to the proxy for price pressure,
DPP , controlling for linear controls and time and firm fixed effects (Almeida et al.,
2016). The pre-trend analysis suggests that there are no statistically or econom-
ically significant differences in the levels (column (1)) or trends (columns (2) to
(5)) of the dependent variables between treated and non-treated firms. Warusaw-
23These results are consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007) (Table 2, pp.487) and
Khan et al. (2012) (Table 1, pp.1376).
24Month 0 (the event month) is defined as the last month of the calendar quarter.
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itharana and Whited (2016) estimate a structural dynamic model of investment
and financial policies, and they find a “near-zero” response of investment to mis-
pricing, particularly for large firms. In the case of small firms, they report that
overvaluation increases equity issuance, and the proceeds are used to hoard cash
and to fund real investment, mitigating the effects of the financial frictions. Simi-
larly, in reduced-form estimations Hau and Lai (2013) and Campello and Graham
(2013) analyze the effect of underpricing and overpricing, respectively, and they
find that while the former reduces investment, the latter increases it, and the effect
operates through financial constraints. In other words, the results from previous
studies indicate that, if anything, the instrument would be biased against finding
results, as downward price pressures would tighten financial constraints.
First-stage estimation
In addition to the exclusion restriction, a good instrument has to satisfy the rel-
evance condition, i.e., the instrument and the endogenous variable have to be
strongly correlated. The first-stage estimation provides a formal test for the rel-
evance condition, and the results are presented in Table 6. In Panel A, I show
the results of Equation 2.2, excluding the interaction term and the asymmetric
information variable, for alternative definitions of repurchases (the full specifica-
tion is presented in Panel B). In column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if the firm repurchases shares in a given quarter, zero otherwise.
The results show that firms that suffer from exogenous price pressures are 2.07%
more likely to repurchase shares in a given quarter, or 6% more likely compared
to the unconditional mean. The coefficient is economically and statistically sig-
nificant after controlling for known determinants of stock repurchases: free cash
flows, past return, firm size, growth opportunities, and leverage. In column (2),
the dependent variable is the ratio of share repurchases normalized by total shares
outstanding, the main measure of stock repurchases used in the paper. The results
show that downward price pressure increases repurchases by 13.5% relative to total
shares outstanding.25 The F-statistic is above 20, suggesting that the instrument
is strong. In columns (3) and (4), repurchases are normalized by total assets and
cash at the beginning of the quarter, respectively. The economic significance is
similar in all cases regardless of the variable used to normalize stock repurchases.
Next, I analyze whether managers identify and exploit price pressure to time
stock purchases. Following Khan et al. (2012), I define Insider Purchases as the
ratio of shares purchased to the sum of shares sold and purchased in a given quarter.
This is a very strong test of undervaluation and market timing ability because, for
instance, financial constraints might limit managers’ capacity to purchase shares.
25The unconditional mean repurchase (normalized by shares outstanding) is 0.0037.
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Alternatively, managers might be reluctant to purchase shares if they already
have a significant stake in the firm and are not willing to increase their private
wealth exposure to this specific stock.26 Column (5) of Table 6 presents the results
of the regression of Insider Purchases on the dummy for price pressure. The
results show that managers increase purchases (or reducing sales) in the quarter
of the exogenous shock, consistent with Ali et al. (2011). The effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level after controlling for observable and unobservable firm
characteristics. Regarding the economic magnitude, the coefficient represents a
5.6% increase relative to the unconditional mean.
Stock repurchases are positively related to firms’ cash flows and size and neg-
atively related to leverage. The direction of the relationship is the opposite for
insider purchases, which would suggest that insiders purchase shares when firms’
financial slack is tighter (higher leverage, lower cash flows or firm size).27 Taken to-
gether, the results suggest that managers have market timing ability, i.e., they buy
shares when the stock price declines, consistent with Ben-Rephael et al. (2014).
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) survey financial executives on payout
policies and find that they repurchase shares when the stock price is below the
fundamental value.28 Similarly, analyzing upward price pressure by mutual funds
with high inflows, Khan et al. (2012) show that firms exploit the temporal misval-
uation to issue equity through seasonal equity offerings to engage in stock-based
acquisitions and insider sales.
Finally, Panel B shows the first-stage estimation when including the interaction
with the market-based information asymmetry proxy for the full sample (columns
(1) to (3)) and for the subsample of firms that are most reliant on external financing
(columns (4) to (6)). Importantly, DPP is a good predictor of actual repurchases
(t-statistics>3, both in the full and the subsample of EFD firms) and DPP*AI is
positive and statistically significant for the regression on Rep*AI. In the last rows,
I report the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) tests for underidentification and
weak instruments, which suggest that the instruments are good.
26Moreover, trade-disclosure rules are more stringent when insiders engage in direct
trading, relative to dealing via the corporation, favoring the latter over the former when
trading on private information (Fried, 2014). However, because this shock is unrelated to
firms prospects, it is unlikely to contain private information, and to be an illegal transac-
tion.
27Mar´ın and Sureda-Gomila (2006) suggest that firms and insiders might specialize in
different types of mispricings. The evidence presented here likely indicates that insiders
act as buyers of last resort when firms are constrained to do so. A further investigation of
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
28This is the most popular response for all stock repurchase questions on the survey:
86.4% of all firms agree or strongly agree with this statement (Brav et al., 2005, pp. 514).
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Second-stage estimation
The endogenous relationship between stock repurchases nd investment suggest
that OLS results might be downward biased. In this section I address this con-
cern. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 present the results of the causal effect of open
market repurchases on investment, measured by CAPEX (Panel A), and CAPEX
+ RD (Panel B). The results show that stock repurchases motivated by exogenous
downward price pressures neither increase nor decrease investment. This finding is
not surprising. There are several reasons that firms repurchase shares (to change
their capital structure, to affect market liquidity, or simply to distribute excess
cash), and they do not always induce firms to cut investment. Contrary to Fried
(2015), these findings suggest that on average firms do not reduce investment to
repurchase bargain stock repurchases that favor long-term (non-selling) sharehold-
ers.
Although the results seem to contradict Almeida et al. (2016), this is not
necessarily the case. Because of the nature of the empirical design, their study
and this one might be treating different firms, providing different local average
treatment effects, and ultimately leading to distinct conclusions (in Section 2.6.2 I
further explore this issue). In untabulated results, I find that the firms treated by
the instrument used in this study are similar in observable characteristics (such as
cash flows, profitability, and investment opportunities) to the average repurchaser
in the population. The most notable difference is that small firms are more likely
to repurchase shares when facing exogenous price pressures (DPP=1).29 This
finding is consistent with Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) who document that small
firms repurchase shares at a lower price compared to their large counterparts.
More important, columns (3) to (5) show that there is substantial variation
in investment when asymmetric information varies. As explained above, actual
repurchases should help firms that are severely affected by asymmetric information
to increase investment through the former’s signaling effect. To explore this effect,
in column (3), I include the interaction term between stock repurchases and the
proxy for market-based asymmetric information (instrumented). The results show
that this interaction is positive and statistically significant for CAPEX + RD,
while it has the expected sign for CAPEX but is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. Notice that once stock repurchases are instrumented, the
negative and statistically significant effect of stock repurchases on firms with low
information asymmetry (AI=0), presented in Table 2, vanishes. In general, the
coefficient on Repurchases is no longer significant.
29The mean market capitalization of firms that repurchase shares when DPP=1
(DPP=0) is 6 (10) billion dollars, suggesting that small firms benefit more from sup-
porting the stock price.
62
In columns (4) and (5), I re-run the regressions for the subsamples of No
EFD and EFD firms, respectively. Consistent with the OLS results presented in
Table (2), the interaction term is positive for the subsample of firms that rely
on external funds to finance investment projects, which benefit the most from
signaling their type. The economic significance is large. Consider column (5)
of Panel B: the 3.18 coefficient means that a 10% increase in stock repurchases
(given a typical increase in AI) leads to a 7% increase in CAPEX+RD in the
following year (relative to the unconditional mean). The interaction is negative
and statistically indistinguishable from zero for cash-rich firms.30 Moreover, the
coefficient on AI shows that EFD firms are more severely affected by adverse
selection when they do not repurchase shares. The lack of stock repurchases would
signal that the firm is bad, and therefore, if the firm does not have excess cash, it
does not increase investment in the following year. Finally, columns (6) of Panels
A and B exclude firm-quarters with positive insider purchases. The coefficient
on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant in Panel B, and
are qualitatively the same as in the benchmark case (column (5)), which suggests
that actual repurchases have a signaling effect that is distinct from direct insider
trading.31
There are two potential concerns that might affect the results presented in
Table 7 and could partially explain the relatively low t-statistics. On the one hand,
the instrument for Repurchases might negatively affect investment in financially
constrained firms (Warusawitharana and Whited, 2016; Hau and Lai, 2013), which
would bias the analysis against finding results, as explained in Section 2.4.2.32 On
the other hand, note that, theoretically, DPP*AI is a valid instrument for Rep*AI
if Repurchases is the only endogenous variable in the model. However, the market-
based proxy for information asymmetry is probably also endogenous. In the next
section, I employ an alternative and plausibly exogenous proxy for asymmetric
information to address this concern.
2.4.3 Alternative proxy for asymmetric information
The instrumental variable approach used in the previous section is intended to
address the endogeneity in stock repurchases. However, some concerns may re-
main regarding the endogeneity of asymmetric information at the firm level, based
30The instrument is weak for the No EFD subsample, so the results should be carefully
interpreted.
31The tests for the weak instruments and underidentification suggest that the instrument
is still robust for this subsample (untabulated).
32Unfortunately, this is a limitation of the instrument, which can increase standard
errors and downward bias the coefficients.
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on the bid-ask spread. Other firm-level variables used in previous papers, such
as the number of analysts or R&D expenditures, might suffer from the same is-
sues (Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2008). One possible way of addressing that
concern is to include an instrument for that variable. Alternatively, a plausibly
exogenous proxy for asymmetric information could be used. In this section, I will
follow the second approach.
I construct a ranked variable based on the mean quarterly VIX index, calcu-
lated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Similar to the firm-level proxy
for asymmetric information, the VIX variable varies from zero (low uncertainty,
V IX = 0) to one (high uncertainty, V IX = 1). This variable is a measure of
the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, and it is plausibly exogenous to
individual firms and, in particular, to the subsample of EFD firms that is com-
posed of smaller companies (the mean size of firms in the (No EFD) EFD group is
(6.3) 3 billion dollars). Kim and Kung (2017) argue that the VIX index captures
the volatility of firms’ market value, i.e., the higher the index, the harder it is
for uninformed investors to distinguish between firm types. The disadvantage of
using this measure is that the variation comes only at the time-series level, but it
is constant for all firms in the same quarter.
The results for the EFD firms using the alternative proxy for asymmetric in-
formation are presented in Table 8.33 In columns (1) and (5), I estimate the
panel fixed-effects model (without year-quarter fixed effects) for CAPEX and
CAPEX+RD, respectively. Consistent with the benchmark results (Table 2), there
is high variation in the effect of actual repurchases on investment when asymmetric
information varies. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant.
Moreover, consistent with Kim and Kung (2017), I find a negative relationship
between the VIX and investment. This negative effect of asymmetric informa-
tion is stronger for the EFD group (the t-statistic on the difference between the
coefficients is 2.1, untabulated). The coefficient on Repurchases is statistically
equal to zero, suggesting that in settings with very low asymmetric information
(VIX=0), stock repurchases do not have real effects. In columns (2) and (6), I
include quarter-year fixed effects (the VIX is omitted in this case), and the results
are qualitatively similar.
The rest of the table presents the estimates when actual repurchases and the
interaction term are instrumented. The same conclusions stated above hold when
endogeneity is addressed, which suggests that the effect is not likely to be driven
by omitted variables. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger, con-
sistent with a downward biased in the fixed-effects estimation. In addition, the
significance is generally stronger when using the VIX rather than the firm-level
33The results for the full sample and No EFD firms are available upon request.
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proxy for information asymmetry. This positive coefficient in column (4) (column
(8)) means that given a typical increase in the VIX, a 10% increase in stock re-
purchases leads to an 5.9% (2.8%) increase in CAPEX (CAPEX+RD) (relative to
the unconditional mean) in the following year, similar to the effect documented
using the alternative proxy for asymmetric information.34
Finally, in Panel B, I present tests for underidentification and weak identifica-
tion in the subsample of EFD firms. In columns (1) to (3), I present the test when
including the VIX variable, while in columns (4) to (6), I report the test results
for the alternative specifications, including quarter-year fixed effects. In all cases,
the null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected.
2.5 Mechanism
Stock repurchases increase investment because they allow firms to raise funds to
finance profitable investment projects at a lower cost of capital. Previous papers
provide preliminary support for that argument. For instance, Billett and Xue
(2007) find that announcements of SEOs that were preceded by repurchase pro-
gram announcements have better stock market reactions compared to those SEOs
that were not preceded by repurchases. This result suggests that firms that signal
their type can raise equity with a lower discount.35 Moreover, the authors show
that when the SEO and repurchase announcement are closer, and firms actually
repurchase shares, the SEO announcement return is not statistically different from
zero, while the returns when the announcements are distant or firms do not repur-
chase shares are between -2 and -3% in the [0,1] interval around the event (and
statistically significant).
In this section I analyze whether firms that signaling through actual repur-
chases increase external financing afterwards, and whether they obtain funds at
a lower cost. Some comments are in order. First, I have no prior regarding the
sources of financing that firms might choose, and in principle it could be either
34The most recent financial crisis could be considered a quasi-experiment for the main
prediction of the paper, as uncertainty over firm type increased dramatically during this
period, and good firms might have experienced greater benefits from signaling. In untabu-
lated results, I create a dummy for the crisis period and interact it with stock repurchases.
I find that the interaction term is positive and highly significant for EFD firms. In particu-
lar, when CAPEX is the dependent variable, β1 = 1.3 (t-statistic=2.5) in the instrumented
regression.
35The authors use a relatively small sample of 116 repurchase program announcements
between 1985 and 1996 that were followed by 132 SEO announcements in the following
three years.
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debt or equity.36 Second, stock repurchases could reduce the cost of capital and
increase external financing in all firms, not only in EFD firms. For instance, if
a cash-rich firm wants to increase its leverage (because of tax benefits or other
reasons), it might want to do so at the lowest possible cost, and it could use stock
repurchases to signal that it is a good firm. In other words, the only distinct pre-
diction between EFD and No EFD firms is related to future investment. Finally,
it is important to note that the exclusion restriction is probably violated in this
case, as downward price pressure will directly increase the cost of equity issuance.
Then, in relative terms, debt will be cheaper than equity when stock prices are
depressed.
2.5.1 Financing policies
Table 9 presents estimates for the financing variables. I present OLS results in the
first three columns (full sample, No EFD, and EFD, respectively) and the instru-
mented regressions in columns (4) and (5) using alternative proxies for asymmetric
information (AI and VIX, respectively). In Panel A, I show changes in net debt
issuance following stock repurchases. The interaction coefficient is positive but
statistically insignificant for the full sample, and the positive coefficient is driven
by the firms that are EFD. The coefficient is positive and marginally significant
for this group (column (3)), while it presents the opposite sign for their cash-
rich counterparts (column (4)). Moreover, the results survive after instrumenting
stock repurchases with exogenous price pressures created by distressed mutual
funds (columns (4) and (5)). The magnitude of the coefficient is large: for a given
standard deviation increase in AI (VIX), a 10% increase in stock repurchases raises
debt issuance by 6.7% (7.1%).
The effect on cash holdings is analyzed in Panel B. There is a strong neg-
ative association between stock repurchases and changes in cash holdings when
asymmetric information is low (AI=0), which is consistent with previous findings
documenting that firms distribute excess cash to shareholders through stock re-
purchases. Interestingly, the effect is no longer significant once the endogenous
variable is instrumented (regardless of the degree of and proxy for asymmetric in-
formation). The interaction coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and the sign is inconsistent for alternative asymmetric information proxies. This
result suggests that the effect is not driven by cash-rich firms that use excess
cash to finance both share repurchases and increased investment. Contrary to this
36In my sample, I find that large (small) firms are more likely to use debt issuance
(SEOs). However, there are other potential determinants of capital structure that tilt
firms towards certain sources of financing (Fama and French, 2005; Strebulaev and Yang,
2013).
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finding, Almeida et al. (2016) show that EPS-motivated repurchases reduce cash
holdings without increasing external sources of finance.
Finally, Panel C presents the results for changes in equity issuance. Net equity
issuance is estimated following the market-measure proxy proposed by Fama and
French (2005). The authors argue that net cash from the statement of cash flows
understates the equity issued because issues that do not produce cash, such as
outright grants of stock to employees or issues to finance mergers, are not reflected
in that account. The OLS results in column (1) show that firms that repurchase
shares issue more equity in the following four quarters, and the effect is positively
related to asymmetric information, but statistically insignificant. The same result
holds I sort firms according to their dependence on external financing (columns
(2) and (3)) or when stock repurchases are instrumented (columns (4) and (5)).
Overall, and consistent with the mechanism proposed in Section 2.2, stock
repurchases are followed by increases in debt issuance for EFD firms, with no
changes in mean cash holdings. Although some firms might be issuing equity to
finance investment projects, the instrument is biased against finding this result
because investors’ liquidity needs depress prices, thereby increasing the cost of
this source of financing.
2.5.2 Cost of capital
If actual repurchases convey information, repurchasers should access capital mar-
kets on better terms, i.e., at a lower cost. In this section, I investigate whether
the cost of debt (measured by the bond yield spread) and equity (proxied by the
discount around the SEO announcement date) are lower for firms that repurchase
shares and, in particular, for firms suffering the most from asymmetric informa-
tion. Data on new bond issues and SEOs are collected from the SDC Platinum
Database. To test that prediction, I will estimate Equation 2.1 with the at-issue
bond yield spread and CAR as dependent variables. Repurchases are measured
as of the previous quarter or the mean repurchase in the previous four quarters.37
Unfortunately, the instrument is not valid for the subsamples of debt issues and
SEOs; therefore, I will only present OLS estimation results, which should be in-
terpreted as an association rather than a causal relationship.
37Recall that repurchase activity is only disclosed at the end of the fiscal quarter; there-
fore, repurchases conducted in the same quarter as the debt or equity issuance cannot be
used to signal firm type.
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Cost of debt
The proxy for the cost of debt is the at-issue bond spread (Spread). The final
sample comprises 1,244 new issuances from 473 unique firms (after merging SDC
data with the main panel used throughout the paper). Panel A of Table 10 provides
summary statistics for the new issues and firm characteristics. The mean spread
of the new issue is 2.8%, and the principal amount is 537 million dollars. The
median firm issuance has a credit rating of BBB-.38 Issuers, are larger on average
(mean market capitalization is 23 billion dollars, while in the main sample, the
average is 4.3 billion), more profitable, have lower investment opportunities, and
are more levered than the mean firm in the full sample.
The results on the effect of stock repurchases on the cost of debt are presented in
Panel B. Column (1) presents the results for the full sample when stock repurchases
are measured in t − 1. Consistent with the signaling story, I find that there is
a negative association between stock repurchases and the cost of debt and that
the relationship is stronger when asymmetric information increases. The main
coefficient of interest, β1, is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic=-3.2).
Columns (2) and (3) present the results for No EFD and EFD firms, respectively,39
and indicate no statistical differences between the two groups, which suggests that
repurchases could help both types of firms to reduce their cost of debt. In the rest
of the table, I repeat the analysis while measuring repurchases as the average of the
previous four quarters. Similar to Billett and Xue (2007), the results are stronger
when the repurchase and the issuance are closer from one another (see Section
2.5.2). Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that stock repurchases
help firms facing high asymmetric information to signal their type and reduce
their cost of capital. The coefficient on Rep*AI in column (3) is -1.02; therefore,
given a typical increase in AI (0.22 in this subsample), a one-standard-deviation
increase in stock repurchases leads to a 0.21% decrease in the at-issue bond spread
(a 7.6% decrease relative to the unconditional mean). The positive coefficient
on AI suggests that the cost of debt is higher for firms facing high asymmetric
information when they do not repurchase shares, as expected.
Cost of equity
The negative market reaction to SEOs is well documented in the literature (Asquith
and Mullins, 1986; Billett and Xue, 2007). Intuitively, in a setting with asymmetric
information, only overvalued firms would issue equity because current shareholders
38The S&P ratings are converted into an ordinal scale ranging from 1=CCC- to
21=AAA+.
39External financial needs are measured at the time of the repurchase.
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would be diluted otherwise. However, firms could use stock repurchases before the
announcement to convey their type to the market, thereby reducing the discount
at which they issue those shares. Billett and Xue (2007) find that when compa-
nies announce repurchase programs and then issue equity, the market reacts less
negatively. In this section, I follow a similar approach to test whether the positive
effect of actual repurchases is increasing in asymmetric information.
The main proxies for the cost of equity are the CAR calculated using the market
model (CAR) and the four-factor model (CAR 4F). The final sample comprises
466 unique firms. Panel A of Table 11 provides summary statistics for the SEOs
and firm characteristics. The mean CAR (CAR 4F) in the [0,1] window around the
SEO announcement is -2.22% (-2.23%), and the principal amount is 130 million
dollars. Firms raising funds through SEOs are smaller on average (mean market
capitalization is 1.4 billion dollars, while in the main sample, the average is 4.3
billion), less profitable, have higher investment opportunities, and are more levered
than the average firm in the full sample.
Panel B presents the regression results for the market reaction in the [0,1] event
window around the announcement of an SEO. In column (1), I present estimates
for the full sample. The positive coefficient β1 is consistent with the idea that stock
repurchases before the SEO help firms to reduce asymmetric information, thereby
lowering the discount at which they issue shares (higher CAR at the announce-
ment). The result is similar when using the Cahart four-factor model (column (4)).
Repurchases are measured at t− 1, and all regressions include industry controls.40
Interestingly, the coefficient is only significant for the subsample of firms that are
EFD. The coefficient on Rep*AI in the last column is 9.8; therefore, given a typical
increase in AI (0.3 in this subsample), a one-standard-deviation increase in stock
repurchases leads to a 2.8% increase in the CAR around the announcement. This
is economically sizable, given that the mean CAR 4F is -2.06. Finally, the negative
coefficient on AI suggests that the discount is larger when asymmetric information
is higher, as expected.
Finally, in untabulated results I find that the effects are not statistically sig-
nificant when I measure stock repurchases as the mean in the four quarters before
the SEO announcement quarter. This result is consistent with Billett and Xue
(2007), who document that the firms conducting actual repurchases close to the
announcement of the SEO have more favorable market reaction than other issuers
and, in particular, that the discount for them is statistically equal to zero, while
firms that repurchase far from the announcement experience a significant discount.
40Firm fixed effects are not feasible because I have less than two SEOs per firm on
average.
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2.6 Additional Tests
2.6.1 Insider ownership
So far, I have assumed throughout the tests that all companies have a manager
(or insiders) with a sufficiently large stake in the firm to induce him or her to re-
purchase shares only in case of undervaluation. This assumption is motivated by
Holderness (2009) which shows that blockholders are present in 96% of American
public firms. Recall that actual stock repurchases can signal firm undervaluation
because insiders are diluted whenever the firm repurchase overvalued shares, be-
cause they transfer value to selling (short-term) shareholder in such a case. In line
with this argument, Babenko (2009) finds that the market reaction to repurchase
program announcements is positively related to the manager’s stock holdings.
I will first explore the results when firm-quarters with negligible levels of man-
agerial ownership (below 1% of shares outstanding) are excluded.41 The effect
should be stronger in this case, because the potential dilution costs are increasing
in managerial ownership. In columns (1) and (4) of Table 12, I re-estimate the in-
strumented regressions for EFD firms for CAPEX and CAPEX+RD, respectively.
The coefficients on the interaction terms are larger than in the benchmark case
(see Table 7), and statistically significant under alternative definitions of invest-
ment. Unfortunately, when I impose higher thresholds for managerial ownership
the instrument becomes weaker, but a 1% stake seems to be a substantial fraction
of the firm for an individual investor.42
Finally, in the rest of the table I analyze the results in the presence of potential
long-term (and informed) investors, which would probably prevent stock repur-
chases if the firm is overvalued. I follow Bushee (1998, 2001) to identify investors
that are more likely to have private information about the firm type. In particular,
Bushee classifies institutional investors according to their investment horizon and
portfolio diversification in quasi-indexers, dedicated and transient investors. The
latter are well-diversified investors with high portfolio turnover. Quasi-indexers
and dedicated are investors with low portfolio turnover, but while the former have
a well diversified portfolio, the latter hold a small number of shares. Therefore,
41I only have managerial ownership data for 57% of the observations, meaning that I am
assuming that firms with missing data have managerial ownership above those thresholds.
The mean market capitalization of firms with non-missing data is 7.3 billion dollars, while
the capitalization of firms with missing data is 0.7 billion dollars. Because being EFD
is statistically negatively correlated with market capitalization, if I drop firms with miss-
ing managerial ownership, I lose the observations that likely drive the result. Moreover,
managers of small firms are more likely to have significant stakes in their companies.
42For instance, for a manager of a firm in the first quartile of the distribution of market
capitalization, a 1% is almost two million dollars investment in a the firm stock.
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dedicated investors are more likely to have private information about the firm
type, and to benefit from bargain stock repurchases (or, conversely, to be harmed
by expensive repurchases). In columns (2) and (5) I estimate the instrumented
regressions for the subsample of firms that have a dedicated investor owning at
least 2% of the outstanding shares. Similarly, in columns (3) and (6) I increase the
threshold to 4%. The results are economically and statistically stronger compared
to the benchmark findings, particularly for CAPEX (see Table 7 for a comparison).
To sum up, the results presented in Table 12 suggest that stock repurchases
help firms increasing investment because they signal firm quality. The credibility
of the signal is enhanced by the presence of managerial and insiders ownership be-
cause firms are less likely to repurchase overvalued shares if their stake would be
diluted. It could be argued that stock repurchases increase managerial ownership
if managers do not tender, inducing them to exert more effort and reducing agency
costs. This alternative story seems unlikely to be driving the results because the
average firm in the EFT subsample already has substantial managerial ownerhsip
(at least 4% in the average firm). Moreover, if agency cost were driving the find-
ings, the estimates should be stronger for firms in which managers hold a lower
proportion of the firm, but the results from Tables 7 and 12 show that this is not
the case.
2.6.2 The effect of EPS targets
Almeida et al. (2016) show that managers are willing to cut investment to finance
stock repurchases to meet EPS targets, while the results presented so far, provide
evidence of stock repurchases increasing investment. Clearly, the firms driving
the results in both studies are different, and so their incentives. If the intersection
between the treated firms in both studies is not null, firms focusing on EPS targets
could be contaminating the results, reducing the power of the tests. In other words,
the results should be stronger once firms with the wrong incentives are dropped
out from the sample.
However, stock repurchases are not the only instrument firms can use to ma-
nipulate EPS ratios to meet analysts consensus. They can also use accruals or
real earnings manipulation. For instance, Burnett, Cripe, Martin, and McAllister
(2012) show that firms use stock repurchases when manipulating accruals is harder
because of higher auditor quality, while Young and Yang (2011), using a sample of
UK firms, document that firms with EPS targets are more likely to manipulate this
ratio using repurchases rather than working capital accruals. Following Almeida
et al. (2016), I will identify firms with pervasive incentives as those around a zero
pre-repurchase EPS surprise (in the interval (-0.003,0.003)). Alternatively, I will
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consider those in the negative pre-repurchase EPS surprise (-0.003,0).43 Table 13
presents the instrumented regressions after excluding firms that are more likely to
engage in myopic behavior to meet EPS targets. The results are both economically
and statistically stronger in these subsamples, consistent with the idea that firms
with incentives to engage in short-term targets might bias against finding a result.
2.6.3 Signaling through dividends
Stock repurchases are not the only signaling device that firms can use to convey
their type to uninformed investors. Several papers in the asymmetric information
literature suggest that dividends can also play this role (Bhattacharya, 1979; Ofer
and Thakor, 1987). Moreover, it might be argued that, because managers are
reluctant to cut dividends (Brav et al., 2005), the credibility of this signal should
be stronger. In the mechanism proposed in this paper, dividends cannot be used
as a signaling tool because they do not allow for separation between firm types
(as there is no dilution costs for bad-firm managers when distributing dividends).
In this section I will explore whether firms are simultaneously using dividends to
convey information, driving the results presented in this paper.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 13 replicate the empirical strategy used in the
panel regression model (Equation 2.1) but replacing repurchases with dividends.
The results show that there is no statistically significant association between divi-
dends and changes in investment, regardless of the level of asymmetric information.
For brevity, I only report the results for the subsample of EFD firms.44 In columns
(2) and (5), I include the repurchase variable and its interaction with asymmetric
information. Notice first that the coefficients on Div and Div*AI are quantitatively
very similar. Moreover, the interaction terms for stock repurchases and informa-
tion asymmetry are virtually the same after the inclusion of these new variables
(see Table 2). In columns (3) and (6), I present the instrumented regressions, and
the the results show that the magnitude of the effect is quantitatively similar when
including dividends.
Finally, in column (7), I analyze whether exogenous price pressures induce firms
to increase dividends to signal undervaluation. The estimate is statistically equal
to zero, suggesting that when undervaluation is relatively large, managers prefer
to signal using repurchases instead of dividends, which is consistent with Ofer and
43The pre-repurchase EPS surprise is calculated as (E + I)/(S + ∆S′), where E is
reported earnings, I is the foregone interest rate due to stock repurchases, S is the number
of shares outstanding, and ∆S′ is the number of shares repurchased in the quarter (Hribar
et al., 2006; Almeida et al., 2016).
44In untabulated results, I find that the coefficient is also insignificant for the No EFD
group.
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Thakor (1987).45 Ofer and Takor provide a model with risk-averse managers in
which both stock repurchases and dividends convey information to the market.
They predict that the former are preferred when the perceived undervaluation is
relatively high (it should be large enough to compensate for the cost of increasing
managerial exposure to the firm’s stock), while dividends would be used when the
firm is relatively fairly priced. Ultimately, the results suggest that firms do not use
dividends to signal their type, and this variable is not driving the results presented
above.
2.7 Conclusion
Many politicians and academics have recently spoken out against stock repur-
chases, arguing that firms are using profits to repurchase shares instead of invest-
ing in new projects to create jobs and sustainable economic growth. Despite these
recent pronouncements, there is little empirical evidence on the effect of stock
buybacks on real outcomes. While Almeida et al. (2016) find that managers trade
off investments for share repurchases that allow them to meet or beat analysts’
EPS forecasts, this paper shows that in the presence of severe asymmetric infor-
mation, repurchases increase investment when firms have to access capital markets
to finance their projects. In addition, actual repurchases increase price efficiency
(Busch and Obernberger, 2017), and investors learn from the disclosure of this in-
formation (Ben-Rephael et al., 2014). These results suggest that repurchases might
have beneficial effects for pricing and efficiency and that imposing restrictions on
firms’ ability to use them could be damaging. Moreover, it is not clear whether
limiting stock repurchases is enough to prevent managers from manipulating the
EPS figure to meet market expectations, as they could still engage in accruals or
real earnings management to that end, which can also be costly for firms (Bur-
nett et al., 2012; Young and Yang, 2011). In summary, it seems that a deeper
understanding of the causes and consequences of stock repurchases is required to
regulate them properly. If anything, a timelier disclosure of actual repurchases
seems desirable to further increase the time informativeness of prices and reduce
the transfer of value from selling to non-selling shareholders (Ben-Rephael et al.,
2014; Fried, 2014).
45The coefficient is zero in the full sample and in the No EFD sample.
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns around mutual funds’ trading pressure
Panel A shows average monthly abnormal returns, measured as the returns in
excess of the Carhart four-factor model, for firms experiencing exogenous price
pressures. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. Panel B presents monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed
lines) around mutual funds’ trading pressure for all firms, while Panel C shows the
cumulative abnormal returns for firms that repurchase shares in the event quarter
(Rep, dashed line) and firms that do not repurchase (No-rep, solid line). The
horizontal axes represent the number of months relative to the event. The event
date, 0, is defined as the last month of the calendar quarter, and the event quarter
is [-2,0].
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Panel A: Average abnormal returns due to mutual funds’ trading pressure.
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Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around trading pressure.
-2
-1
0
1
C
A
R
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Dif
Rep No-rep
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns for repurchasing and non-repurchasing
firms.
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Table 1: Firms’ summary statistics
Obs Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3
Repurchases (indicator) 69816 0.344 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
If Rep>0:
Repurchases (level) 24025 57.78 115.0 0.68 7.19 49.0
Repurchases (shares outstanding) 24025 0.011 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Repurchases (total assets) 24025 0.016 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Repurchases (cash) 23971 0.205 0.34 0.01 0.06 0.22
CAPEX 69816 0.013 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
RD 69816 0.015 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02
CAPEX + RD 69816 0.027 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
Cash 69814 0.219 0.23 0.04 0.13 0.32
Debt 69816 0.012 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Common Equity Issuance 69808 0.022 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01
Institutional ownership 65029 0.616 0.26 0.42 0.68 0.83
Mutual fund ownership 69277 0.205 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.30
Market Capitalization (billions) 69816 4.258 19.02 0.19 0.61 2.07
Size 69816 6.311 1.78 5.03 6.23 7.50
Cash Flow 69816 0.017 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04
ROA 69783 0.008 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.10
Tobin’s Q 69816 2.148 1.55 1.23 1.65 2.46
MB 67574 3.441 4.11 1.46 2.29 3.76
Leverage 69816 0.190 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.30
Dividends 69813 0.003 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in this paper. The main
databases are Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson Reuters. All the variables are defined in
Appendix B.
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Table 2: Panel regression results
Panel A: CAPEX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repurchases -0.0097 -0.0069 -0.0324 -0.0168 -0.0322
(-1.5413) (-1.0895) (-3.7491) (-2.2562) (-1.9645)
Rep*AI 0.0741 0.0134 0.1304
(4.0342) (0.7077) (3.6524)
AI -0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0031
(-6.0913) (-1.8359) (-5.5195)
CF 0.0109 0.0096 0.0094 0.0030 0.0119
(7.5781) (6.6322) (6.5120) (1.9205) (6.2280)
Q 0.0017 0.0015 0.0013 0.0015 0.0012
(12.2498) (10.2685) (9.3083) (6.2672) (7.0154)
Return 0.0042 0.0041 0.0028 0.0045
(14.9594) (14.6501) (8.2652) (12.1232)
Size -0.0040 -0.0045 -0.0028 -0.0049
(-10.1338) (-10.8202) (-5.7988) (-9.3179)
Lev -0.0080 -0.0075 -0.0044 -0.0083
(-6.5959) (-6.3383) (-3.4249) (-5.1248)
Sample All All All No EFD EFD
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 28,432 41,141
Adj within R2 0.0177 0.0432 0.0446 0.0287 0.0449
The table presents the results of the panel fixed-effects estimation. The dependent vari-
ables are CAPEX (Panel A) and CAPEX+RD (Panel B). In column (1), I control for
investment opportunities (Q) and cash flows (CF). In column (2), I include other known
determinants of investment, firm size (Size), past return (Return) and leverage (Lev). In
column (3), I include the interaction with the proxy for asymmetric information (AI).
Columns (4) and (5) present the results for the subsamples of external finance indepen-
dent (No EFD) and external finance dependent (EFD) firms, respectively. All regressions
include quarter-year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Panel B: CAPEX+RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repurchases -0.0178 -0.0181 -0.0591 -0.0267 -0.0632
(-2.2124) (-2.1481) (-5.3998) (-3.1316) (-3.1362)
Rep*AI 0.1209 0.0223 0.1945
(4.8265) (1.0263) (4.3082)
AI -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0038
(-5.1834) (-2.4783) (-4.5634)
CF 0.0312 0.0271 0.0269 0.0102 0.0362
(7.9682) (7.2246) (7.1641) (3.6004) (7.1488)
Q 0.0039 0.0035 0.0034 0.0017 0.0036
(12.8887) (11.4438) (10.8674) (4.8380) (9.0850)
Return 0.0071 0.0070 0.0032 0.0084
(14.4036) (14.2219) (7.2408) (11.8225)
Size -0.0053 -0.0058 -0.0038 -0.0064
(-7.6311) (-8.1461) (-5.2007) (-6.5554)
Lev -0.0176 -0.0170 -0.0080 -0.0206
(-7.3632) (-7.1680) (-4.2950) (-6.0201)
Sample All All All No EFD EFD
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 28,432 41,141
Adj within R2 0.0381 0.0648 0.0656 0.0305 0.0695
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Table 3: Insider trading
CAPEX CAPEX+RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -0.0299 -0.0176 -0.0294 -0.0513 -0.0268 -0.0523
(-3.3207) (-2.3253) (-1.6832) (-4.5740) (-3.0734) (-2.4221)
Rep*AI 0.0640 0.0104 0.1131 0.0976 0.0200 0.1460
(3.2001) (0.5209) (2.8902) (3.7111) (0.8866) (2.9708)
AI -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0016 -0.0033
(-5.3237) (-2.1589) (-4.6540) (-4.6195) (-2.7752) (-3.9224)
Sample All No EFD EFD All No EFD EFD
Observations 60,475 24,546 35,642 60,475 24,546 35,642
Adj within R2 0.042 0.030 0.040 0.064 0.032 0.067
This table presents additional analyses to panel fixed-effects estimations, excluding firm-
quarters with positive net insider purchases. In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable
is CAPEX, while in columns (4) to (6), it is CAPEX + RD. All regressions include quarter-
year and firm fixed effects and controls for known determinants of investment, X. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are
defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 5: Pre-existing difference in investment policies
Level Change Change Change Change
(t-1) (t-2 to t-1) (t-3 to t-1) (t-4 to t-1) (t-5 to t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: CAPEX
DPP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0941) (0.0798) (1.3207) (-0.4660) (0.1707)
Adj within R2 0.0059 0.0010 0.0021 0.0023 0.0020
Dependent variable: CAPEX + RD
DPP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003
(0.1930) (0.1714) (1.3234) (0.1690) (0.5798)
Adj within R2 0.0162 0.0013 0.0038 0.0008 0.0009
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 69,660 68,808
The table presents the results for pre-existing difference in investment policy: capital
expenditures (CAPEX) and the sum of capital expenditures and research and development
expenditure (CAPEX + RD). The dependent variables are the levels of (column (1)) and
changes in (columns (2) to (5)) the investment variables. All regressions include quarter-
year and firm fixed effects as well as known determinants of investment, X. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined
in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 6: First-stage estimation
Panel A: Alternative stock repurchase definitions
Repurchases Insider
Indicator Sh. Out. Assets Cash Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DPP 0.0207 0.0005 0.0006 0.0088 0.0117
(5.0484) (5.2169) (4.5831) (3.7499) (2.6773)
CF 0.0403 0.0010 0.0048 -0.0711 -0.3405
(1.0706) (1.2923) (3.5917) (-3.8663) (-7.0070)
Q -0.0052 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0028 -0.0477
(-1.7780) (-6.5170) (3.5130) (2.6236) (-14.4715)
Return -0.0271 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0126 -0.1928
(-4.6175) (-8.3728) (-4.6809) (-5.0375) (-18.3577)
Size 0.0561 0.0007 0.0015 0.0138 -0.0809
(5.8173) (4.6927) (6.0777) (3.4770) (-9.0038)
Lev -0.2781 -0.0061 -0.0102 -0.1242 0.1390
(-9.0439) (-10.7629) (-11.1763) (-8.4175) (5.0211)
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 69,564 45,554
F-test 25.49 27.22 21.00 13.41 14.06
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Panel B: Interactions
Repurchases Repurchases Rep*AI Repurchases Repurchases Rep*AI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPP 0.0005 0.0007 0.0001 0.0005 0.0007 0.0001
(5.2169) (4.0939) (1.5477) (4.4737) (3.4796) (1.1705)
DPP*AI -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004
(-1.3713) (2.8809) (-1.2751) (2.1463)
AI -0.0009 0.0031 -0.0009 0.0019
(-3.8342) (20.4256) (-3.8643) (13.7116)
CF 0.0010 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0001
(1.2923) (1.2062) (0.8909) (-0.7734) (-0.8459) (-0.3152)
Q -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000
(-6.5170) (-7.4090) (-2.1567) (-5.7634) (-6.8067) (-2.3813)
Return -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0003
(-8.3728) (-8.6954) (-3.9241) (-6.6066) (-6.8926) (-3.4241)
Size 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004
(4.6927) (3.6710) (7.5660) (3.6589) (2.4135) (5.5180)
Lev -0.0061 -0.0060 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0014
(-10.7629) (-10.5201) (-10.4923) (-7.2270) (-6.9900) (-6.7959)
Sample All All All EFD EFD EFD
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 41,141 41,141 41,141
SW Chi-sq test 27.22 19.83 29.09 20.01 14.91 14.88
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
SW F(1,3040) 27.24 19.81 29.06
SW F(1,2791) 20.04 14.88 16.80
Table 6 presents the first-stage estimation results. Panel A shows the first stage under
alternative definitions of stock repurchases: an indicator variable that is equal to one if
the firm repurchases shares in the quarter, repurchases normalized by shares outstanding,
assets or cash (columns (1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively) and insider trading (column
(5)) defined as the ratio of insider purchases normalized by the sum of insider sales and
purchases. Panel B presents the first-stage estimation for the interaction in the full sample
(columns (1) to (3)) and the subsample of EFD firms (columns (4) to (6)). All regressions
include quarter-year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 7: Second-stage estimation
Panel A: CAPEX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -0.2354 0.0921 -0.1905 0.8580 -0.6529 -0.4295
(-1.0817) (0.3793) (-0.5885) (1.2109) (-1.3207) (-0.9100)
Rep*AI 0.5031 -1.9192 1.6663 1.4445
(0.7402) (-1.6148) (1.4965) (1.2795)
AI -0.0041 0.0097 -0.0067 -0.0057
(-1.6965) (1.4787) (-2.5169) (-2.1173)
Sample All All All No EFD EFD EFD
Insider Purchases All All All All All ≤ 0
Controls CF,Q All All All All All
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 28,432 41,141 35,642
Panel B: CAPEX+RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -0.3558 0.1235 -0.7646 0.1897 -1.3764 -1.2610
(-1.0893) (0.3413) (-1.6112) (0.3167) (-1.8024) (-1.7300)
Rep*AI 1.6864 -0.4237 3.1832 3.2861
(1.6850) (-0.3571) (1.7910) (1.8249)
AI -0.0088 0.0010 -0.0110 -0.0107
(-2.4559) (0.1543) (-2.6008) (-2.5144)
Sample All All All No EFD EFD EFD
Insider Purchases All All All All All ≤ 0
Controls CF,Q All All All All All
Observations 69,816 69,816 69,816 28,432 41,141 35,642
Table 7 presents the second-stage estimation for the investment variables: CAPEX (Panel
A) and CAPEX + RD (Panel B). All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables
are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
84
Table 8: Alternative proxy for asymmetric information
Panel A
CAPEX CAPEX+INV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Repurchases -0.009 -0.008 -1.684 -1.253 -0.036 -0.036 -2.102 -1.272
(-0.478) (-0.436) (-1.924) (-1.513) (-1.376) (-1.368) (-1.620) (-1.034)
Rep*VIX 0.049 0.042 2.700 2.465 0.094 0.077 3.232 2.461
(1.858) (1.563) (2.660) (2.479) (2.567) (2.042) (2.178) (1.717)
VIX -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.012
(-6.326) (-3.649) (-6.082) (-3.222)
Estimation OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 41,141 41,141 41,141 41,141 41,141 41,141 41,141 41,141
Quarter-year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Panel B
Specification: Columns (3) and (7) Columns (4) and (8)
SW Chi-sq(1) P-val SW F(1,2874) SW Chi-sq(1) P-val SW F(1,2874)
Repurchases 11.11 0.0009 11.10 10.76 0.0010 10.75
Rep*VIX 11.30 0.0008 11.29 11.12 0.0009 11.10
Panel A of Table 8 presents the second-stage estimation for the investment variables:
CAPEX (columns (1) to (4)) and CAPEX + RD (columns (5) and (8)) for the subsample
of EFD firms. Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) present the OLS results, and Columns (3)-(4)
and (7)-(8) show the instrumented regressions. All regressions include firm fixed effects
and firm controls, X. Panel B reports the results of underidentification and weak iden-
tification tests for the instrumental variable estimations. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix
B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
85
Table 9: Financing policies
Panel A: DEBT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repurchases -0.0350 0.0551 -0.0654 -2.2686 -2.8910
(-1.3026) (1.9402) (-1.3884) (-1.3149) (-1.0937)
Rep*AI 0.0526 -0.1143 0.1574 6.3648
(0.9498) (-1.8305) (1.7325) (1.9104)
Rep*VIX 6.3569
(2.0321)
Panel B: CASH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repurchases -1.2138 -0.9198 -1.0781 -10.2861 1.3655
(-9.9499) (-9.7924) (-5.6359) (-1.6181) (0.1400)
Rep*AI 0.4150 -0.0115 0.0825 21.0822
(1.6429) (-0.0462) (0.2164) (1.4661)
Rep*VIX -3.4238
(-0.3106)
Panel C: EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repurchases 0.1342 0.1209 0.2610 1.5588 0.2969
(2.8498) (2.1245) (3.8247) (0.5819) (0.0633)
Rep*AI 0.1311 0.0982 -0.1108 1.9147
(1.3755) (0.9435) (-0.7322) (0.2683)
Rep*VIX 3.9256
(0.6942)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Sample All No EFD EFD EFD EFD
Observations 69,806 28,424 41,139 41,139 41,139
Table 9 presents the results for the financing variables: net debt issuance (DEBT, Panel A),
cash holdings (CASH, Panel B), and net equity issuance (EQUITY, Panel C). In columns
(1) to (4), the proxy for asymmetric information is AI, while in columns (5), it is the VIX.
The first three columns present OLS regressions for the full sample, No EFD firms and
EFD firms, respectively, and the last two columns show the instrumented coefficients. All
regressions include firm and time fixed effects and firm controls, X. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in
Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 10: Cost of debt
Panel A: Summary statistics
Obs Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3
Bond variables
Principal (millions) 1244 537 418 300 450 600
Spread 1244 0.028 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04
Rating 1227 10.422 3.52 8.00 11.00 13.00
Maturity (years) 1244 10.298 6.89 7.00 10.00 10.00
Public 1244 0.998 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00
Callable 1244 0.084 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm variables
MktCap 1244 23.07 44.16 2.70 7.59 21.74
Size 1244 8.940 1.21 8.07 8.94 9.97
CF 1244 0.028 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04
ROA 1244 0.061 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.10
Q 1244 1.787 0.73 1.28 1.61 2.14
Lev 1244 0.311 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.40
Panel B: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -0.0387 -0.0086 0.0052 -0.0696 -0.0315 -0.0693
(-1.5141) (-0.1626) (0.1153) (-1.6260) (-0.3353) (-1.2328)
Rep*AI -0.6377 -1.0032 -1.0216 -0.5669 -0.7330 -0.5924
(-3.2295) (-2.6463) (-2.4054) (-2.0419) (-2.1130) (-1.4819)
AI 0.0143 0.0245 0.0117 0.0140 0.0178 0.0114
(3.4006) (2.8583) (2.2987) (2.7131) (2.4012) (2.4981)
Time to maturity 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001
(0.9492) (2.4093) (0.0211) (0.8771) (2.2326) (1.2009)
Sample All No EFD EFD All No EFD EFD
Repurchases t-1 t-1 t-1 (t-1,t-4) (t-1,t-4) (t-1,t-4)
Observations 1,044 337 549 1,044 179 755
Adj within R2 0.108 0.203 0.0603 0.0998 0.215 0.106
Panel A of Table 10 presents summary statistics for new debt issuance. Panel B shows the
results of estimating Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is the debt spread at the time of
the bond issue. In columns (1) to (3), the explanatory variable is stock repurchases in the
previous quarter, while in columns (4) to (6), it is the average repurchase in the previous 4
quarters. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects and firm controls, X. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are
defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 11: Cost of equity
Panel A: Summary statistics
Obs Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3
SEO variables
Principal (millions) 569 130 231 28.13 67.50 140
CAR 574 -0.022 0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.03
Firm variables
MktCap 574 1.37 3.89 0.15 0.38 0.97
Size 574 5.683 1.76 4.38 5.60 6.82
CF 574 -0.006 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.04
ROA 574 -0.094 0.35 -0.13 0.02 0.07
Q 574 2.773 2.34 1.34 1.92 3.16
Lev 574 0.260 0.23 0.05 0.24 0.39
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal return
CAR CAR 4F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -3.8651 -13.3765 -3.8156 -3.9396 -11.7888 -3.9299
(-3.6774) (-1.3958) (-3.7735) (-3.4560) (-1.2827) (-3.6094)
Rep*AI 4.9086 25.5016 7.4777 6.1978 23.3369 9.8364
(2.1237) (1.3522) (3.9793) (2.1579) (1.3088) (4.6933)
AI -0.0405 -0.0248 -0.0478 -0.0431 -0.0234 -0.0515
(-1.7214) (-0.3488) (-1.6412) (-1.7486) (-0.3514) (-1.7453)
Sample All No EFD EFD All No EFD EFD
Repurchases t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
Observations 567 105 426 567 105 426
Adj within R2 0.055 0.081 0.053 0.059 0.059 0.062
Table 11 presents the cross-sectional estimation for the cost of equity, measured by the
cumulative abnormal return in the [0,1] window around the SEO announcement. All
regressions include time and industry fixed effects (2-digit SIC code) and firm controls, X.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the quarter-year level.
All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient
estimates.
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Table 12: Insider ownership
CAPEX INV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repurchases -1.4432 -1.1331 -1.4252 -2.2575 -1.7971 -1.7219
(-1.4504) (-1.7932) (-2.0479) (-1.4434) (-1.7998) (-1.6859)
Rep*AI 3.1420 3.3521 3.6948 5.0048 4.7797 4.8756
(1.8480) (1.6909) (2.0961) (1.8696) (1.5839) (1.8125)
AI -0.0096 -0.0099 -0.0119 -0.0134 -0.0151 -0.0173
(-2.7114) (-2.2227) (-2.7249) (-2.4079) (-2.2362) (-2.6040)
Sample EFD EFD EFD EFD EFD EFD
Insider ownership MO>1% DED>2% DED>4% MO>1% DED>2% DED>4%
Observations 31,406 12,080 8,773 31,406 12,080 8,773
P-value (Rep) 0.0192 0.0004 0.0043 0.0192 0.0004 0.0043
P-value (Rep*AI) 0.0006 0.0023 0.0022 0.0006 0.0023 0.0022
Table 12 presents the second-stage estimation for the investment variables: CAPEX
(columns (1) and (3)) and CAPEX + RD (columns (4) and (6)) for the subsample of
EFD firms. Columns (1) and (3) present the results when firms with negligible managerial
ownership are excluded. Columns (2) and (5) show the estimations when firms have at
least one dedicated investor (Bushee, 1998, 2001) with 2% ownership, while in columns
(3) and (6), there is at least one dedicated investor owning 4% of the shares outstanding.
All regressions include year and firm fixed effects and firm controls, X. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined
in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 13: The effect of EPS targets
CAPEX INV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Repurchases -1.6295 -0.8595 -2.9357 -1.5693
(-1.2225) (-1.5795) (-1.3517) (-1.8552)
Rep*AI 3.6757 2.1150 6.5587 3.5880
(1.6677) (1.8545) (1.7899) (1.9786)
AI -0.0095 -0.0076 -0.0139 -0.0118
(-2.6974) (-3.0067) (-2.3690) (-2.9734)
Sample EFD EFD EFD EFD
Sue adj excluded (-0.003,0.003) (-0.003,0) (-0.003,0.003) (-0.003,0)
Observations 19,044 33,250 19,044 33,250
P-value (Rep) 0.0349 0.0002 0.0349 0.0002
P-value (Rep*AI) 0.0055 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000
This table presents the instrumented regressions after excluding firm-quarters with pre-
repurchase EPS surprise (Sue adj) in the interval (-0.003,0.003) (columns (1) and (3)),
and (-0.003,0) (columns (2) and (4)). All regressions include firm and time fixed effects
and firm controls, X. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported below the
coefficient estimates.
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Table 14: Signaling through dividends
CAPEX CAPEX+RD Div
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Div 0.025 0.028 0.053 -0.008 -0.005 0.043
(0.541) (0.594) (1.065) (-0.136) (-0.078) (0.649)
Div*AI 0.036 0.033 0.004 0.067 0.063 0.009
(0.530) (0.487) (0.051) (0.735) (0.693) (0.082)
Repurchases -0.032 -0.660 -0.063 -1.383
(-1.972) (-1.335) (-3.138) (-1.810)
Rep*AI 0.131 1.677 0.194 3.191
(3.657) (1.509) (4.307) (1.798)
AI -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011
(-4.978) (-5.354) (-2.578) (-4.083) (-4.479) (-2.658)
DPP 0.000
(0.426)
Estimation OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS
Sample EFD EFD EFD EFD EFD EFD EFD
Observations 41,140 41,140 41,140 41,140 41,140 41,140 41,140
In this table, I analyze whether dividends are driving the results in the EFD sample. In
columns (1) to (3), I analyze the association between dividends and CAPEX, while in
columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is CAPEX+RD. The last columns analyze
whether exogenous price pressures increase dividends. All regressions include firm and
time fixed effects and firm controls, X. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates.
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Chapter 3
The role of accounting quality
during mutual fund fire sales
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the role of financial reporting quality on mitigating the
underpricing resulting from investors liquidity needs, i.e., unrelated to firm funda-
mentals. Lee and So (2015) argue that “Market prices are buffeted by a continuous
flow of information, or rumours and innuendos disguised as information” (pp. 64).
The process of incorporating relevant information into prices by market partici-
pants takes time and effort, and as a consequence firm stock prices might suffer
deviations from the fundamental value. In particular, undervaluation is problem-
atic for firms that need to raise funds externally, as they are likely to issue debt or
equity at a discount, which has real effects (e.g. Baker et al., 2003; Edmans et al.,
2012; Hau and Lai, 2013).
The objective of financial reporting is to provide information about the firm
that is useful for current and potential investors decision-making. Higher finan-
cial reporting quality should mitigate information asymmetries, providing a better
estimation of firms’ fundamental, reducing adverse selection in the trading of se-
curities, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital. This could be achieved,
for example, if financial reporting facilitates the writing of better contracts that
prevents the misuse of firm’s resources, monitor managerial decisions, and earnings
figures that provide more information about the firm’s performance (e.g. Biddle,
Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010).
Previous studies show that reporting quality matters in broad samples and over
long periods (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005; Jin and Myers, 2006;
Biddle et al., 2009). However, some scholars cast doubts on the usefulness of ac-
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counting information due to the use of noisy estimates and judgment calls, the lack
of comparability of financial statements, and managerial incentives to misreport
(Sherman and Young, 2016). If that were the case, investors might decide to rely
on alternative (arguably, more timely and reliable) sources of information, such
as analysts recommendations (Sulaeman and Wei, 2018) or management earning
forecasts (Kadach, 2017), to assess the value of a firm. That is, whether accounting
quality matters, particularly during periods of severe underpricing, is ultimately
an empirical question.
While previous studies have mainly analyzed the role of accounting quality in
incorporating fundamental information into stock prices, its role during the ar-
rival of non-fundamental information has been generally left unaddressed. Recent
studies documented that correlated mutual funds liquidity needs are an important
source of price pressure for the stocks that these mutual funds hold in their port-
folios, causing temporary mispricing in these securities (e.g. Coval and Stafford,
2007; Ali et al., 2011; Khan et al., 2012; Sulaeman and Wei, 2018).
Analyzing the role of accounting quality in this setting is motivated by several
reasons. On the one hand, this shock is arguably exogenous to firms fundamen-
tals. Previous papers documented price reversals following mutual fund fire sales,
consistent with the temporary mispricing. We also document this finding for our
sample period (see Figure 1).1 On the other hand, the price impact of mutual
funds fire sales are significant and long-lasting. The cumulative abnormal return
might drop up to -14% and it can take more than one year to return to fundamen-
tal value (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Sulaeman and Wei, 2018), which can distort
real activities (Edmans et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2012; Hau and Lai, 2013). To
sum up, the exogeneity of the shock, and the strong impact on prices (and the
associated real effects it might have) make it an ideal setting to analyze the role
of accounting quality.
We build on Coval and Stafford (2007) to create our proxy for exogenous price
pressure. The authors show that when mutual funds (which own a significant
fraction of American publicly traded firms) face strong liquidity needs because of
investors redemptions, they might be forced to fire sale part of the assets they
hold in their portfolios, generating temporary misvaluations in the stocks that
they sell. Fire sales due to mutual funds liquidity needs increase uncertainty
regarding the value of firms suffering price pressures, and therefore, increases the
need for reliable information to accurately price stocks. Lee and So (2015) argue
1Also consistent with this arguments, Ali et al. (2011) show that forced sales and
purchases do not predict changes in future performance. On the other hand, we find
that distressed mutual funds reduce or eliminate 62% of their positions (untabulated),
which makes it unlikely that they cherry pick the stock they sell based on expected future
prospects. Kadach (2017) finds similar figures (see Table 2, p.41).
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that the extent to which prices may differ from fundamentals are driven by the
cost that informed arbitrageurs face when they are pricing securities. If financial
reports fulfill their role of reducing information asymmetries between the firm
and market participants, firms with better accounting quality should experience
less severe mispricings. Therefore, we predict that firms with better accounting
quality will have a lower negative price impact when mutual funds fire sale their
portfolio holdings, because high-quality accruals help investors pricing firms more
accurately through a reduction in the uncertainty regarding firm value.
We construct our main proxy for accounting quality based on the aforemen-
tioned argument that financial reporting should provide information about the
firm’s operations, especially its cash flows. In particular, the accruals component
of earnings are valuable if they can be linked to cash flows and provide valuable
information to estimate the firm’s stock price. Namely, the higher the link be-
tween accruals and cash flows, the more valuable accruals are to investors, as they
smooth out transitory fluctuations in cash flows. Building on this idea, Dechow
and Dichev (2002) derive a measure of accrual quality as the residuals from the
regression of changes in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash
flows. We use the augmented version suggested by McNichols (2002) (which also
considers changes in revenue and property plant and equipment as explanatory
variables) as our main proxy for accounting quality.
Consistent with our prediction, we find evidence that firms with higher fi-
nancial reporting quality have lower deviations from fundamental value compared
to their lower quality counterparts. In particular, we find that firms in the top
quintiles of accounting quality experience an abnormal return (using the 4-factor
model as a benchmark) of -0.96%, while those in the bottom quintiles have an
abnormal return more than 4 times larger (-4.2%) in the quarter in which mutual
fund experience liquidity needs. In terms of economic significance, an increase of
one decile of accounting quality increases the abnormal return by 0.255% in the
quarter of the shock, 0.603% when including the previous quarter, and 0.708%
when considering also the following quarter. These figures imply a 17% to 20%
reduction in the mispricing during those event windows. These results hold after
controlling for firm and stock characteristics previously considered in the literature
(e.g., institutional ownership, market capitalization, analysts coverage), and are
robust to a wide set of additional tests, such as alternative benchmarks to estimate
abnormal returns, the inclusion of additional controls, the use of median regres-
sion that is less sensitive to the effect of outliers, or the exclusion of financial and
regulated firms and alternative earnings quality measures 2. These findings are
consistent the value relevance of accounting information (Francis et al., 2005), and
2We also consider the unadjusted Dechow and Dichev (2002) proxy and results remain
qualitatively similar.
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suggests that having better accounting quality help investors disentangling noise
from fundamental information in equity prices, and causing smaller deviations
from fundamental value.
Some alternative explanations for our results would be either that the mea-
sures for accounting quality are capturing the effect of governance, or that they
proxy for firms complexity. Regarding the former, the inclusion of controls for
institutional ownership and analysts coverage, two widely used proxies for gover-
nance, help us to reduce this concerns. Regarding the latter, prior research shows
that firm complexity makes it harder for market participant to understand and
incorporate firm specific information into prices (Cohen and Lou, 2012; Barinov,
Park, and Yildizhan, 2016). We want to rule out the possibility that our proxy
for accruals quality might be capturing firm complexity, rather than the extent to
which accruals map into cash-flows, we include additional controls for firm eco-
nomic fundamentals (the length of the operating cycle, the volatility of sales and
cash flows and the incidence of losses over the last 10 years) that previous studies
find to affect accruals quality (Francis et al., 2005). We find that firm complexity
is not driving the results, and that the economic magnitude remains fairly stable
after including these additional variables.
Moreover, our result are robust to alternative definitions of accounting quality.
Previous literature suggests that conditional conservatism is a desirable property
of financial reporting (Khan and Watts, 2009), as it provides a hard benchmark
to evaluate firm performance (e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008; Garc´ıa-Lara, Garc´ıa-
Osma, and Penalva, 2016). In additional tests we find that more conservative firms
return to fundamental value faster, but we do not find consistent evidence of con-
servatism reducing the mispricing during or before the event quarter. Finally, we
exclude multiple shocks to a firm in the same year to rule out the possibility of the
results being driven by firms suffering continuous shocks. All the aforementioned
conclusions remain unchanged in this reduced sample.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this paper contributes to
the literature exploring how internal and external stakeholders actions can miti-
gate misvaluations driven by mutual fund liquidity needs. Previous studies look at
insider trading and option grants (Ali et al., 2011), management earnings forecasts
(Kadach, 2017) or analysts recommendations (Sulaeman and Wei, 2018). To the
best of our knowledge our paper is the first to look at the effect of financial report-
ing quality in mitigating mispricing due to mutual funds fire sales. Understanding
how insiders and outsiders actions may attenuate mispricing is particularly im-
portant, as several papers document that fire sales and purchases have real effects
(Coval and Stafford, 2007; Edmans et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2012; Hau and Lai,
2013).
Second, we contribute to the literature on the usefulness of high quality finan-
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cial reporting reducing information asymmetries when the firm faces exogenous
market shocks. In this sense, our paper relates to Hilary (2008) who finds that
firms with better accounting quality experience a lower mispricing during catas-
trophic market events compared to firms with low accounting quality. Hilary
(2008) explores firms mispricing in the 10 lowest return days between 1981 and
2006. Our setting allow us to provide a better identification of the relationship
between specific firm mispricing and reporting quality and a clearer interpretation
of the results, as our findings are not likely to be confounded by other factors such
as changes in risk aversion, which are likely to occur during catastrophic market
events.
Finally, our paper is also related to the extensive body of research that shows
that stock prices under-react to earnings announcements (e.g., Ball and Brown,
1968), changes in analysts recommendations (e.g., Womack, 1996), or other major
corporate events. Some explanations for the price drifts include methodological
issues (Fama, 1998), behavioral explanations (disposition effect) (Frazzini, 2006),
the lack of institutional investors attention to these news (Ben-Rephael, Da, and
Israelsen, 2017b), or firm complexity (Cohen and Lou, 2012; Barinov et al., 2016).
In this paper, we contribute to this debate proposing that the quality of the ac-
counting information might partly explain the slow incorporation of news to prices.
We depart from previous papers by exploiting an exogenous mispricing event, that
is unrelated to firms fundamentals, to test our main predictions that firms with
higher accounting quality have lower mispricings.
3.2 Data and Research Design
3.2.1 Sample
The sample period spans from 2004 until 2016.3 We use several databases. Finan-
cial information is gathered from Compustat. We collect data on stock prices from
CRSP and keep all ordinary shares (share codes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchange codes 1, 2, and 3). To identify firm-quarters
with exogenous price pressures we gather data on mutual funs’ holdings, returns
and total net assets from Thomson Reuters and CRSP Mutual Fund database.
Finally, the risk-free rate and factors data used to estimate abnormal returns is
collected from the Kenneth R. French Data Library.
3We start in 2004 because since that year, mutual funds have to disclose their portfolio
holdings on a quarterly basis, reducing measurement error in our proxy for price pressure.
The last year is 2016 because we need data on future cash flows to estimate the proxies of
accounting quality.
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3.2.2 Variable definition
Mispricing
Open-end mutual funds are important market players in American stock markets.
From time to time they face liquidity needs because investors redemptions might
exceed cash available. When that happens, mutual funds might be forced to fire
sale part of the assets they hold in their portfolios. Similarly, funds might receive
large inflows in a given period, forcing managers to quickly buy stocks, to avoid
accumulating cash above the optimal level. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that
forced sales (purchases) can be particularly costly when there is overlap of securities
among distressed mutual funds, because prices deviate from fundamental value,
causing temporary misvaluations of the assets that are being sold. Several previous
papers have exploit this shock, relying on some variation of their proxy to identify
stock mispricing (Ali et al., 2011; Edmans et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2012).
Building on that idea, we mainly follow Coval and Stafford (2007) to create
our proxy for exogenous price pressures. First of all, we identify distressed mutual
funds, as those having extreme flows in a given quarter. Mutual fund flow are
obtained as follows:4
MFFjt =
TNAj,t − TNAj,t−1(1 +Rj,t)
TNAj,t−1
, (3.1)
where TNAj,t are fund’s j total net assets of the quarter t, and Rj,t is the fund’s
j return in t.5 We drop highly concentrated funds (less than 10 holdings), and
those with extreme changes in TNA.6 Then, distressed mutual fund are those in
the top and lowest deciles of the distribution of flows in a given quarter.
Secondly, for each stock, we obtain a proxy for price pressure, Pressureit, as
the difference between outflow-induced sales and inflow-induced purchases, and we
normalize it by the average trading volume:
Pressurei,t =
Σj(max(0,− M H)|MFFj,t < P (10th))− Σj(max(0,M H)|MFFj,t > P (90th))
V oli,t−1
,
(3.2)
4In line with previous papers, we drop balanced, bond, money market, and international
mutual funds, as well as those that do not primarily invest in US common equity.
5CRSP Mutual Fund database provides monthly data for returns and total net assets,
but stock holdings are only available on a quarterly basis. Therefore, in order to merge
both databases we convert all the variables to quarterly frequency.
6Following Coval and Stafford (2007) we keep those −50% < 4TNA < 200%.
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where 4H is the change in holding from quarter t− 1 to quarter t, and V oli,t−1 is
the trading volume in the previous quarter. Finally, following previous studies, we
define a firm to be suffering fire sales if it is in the top decile of the distribution of
Pressure. We require firms to be owned at least by five mutual funds to calculate
this variable (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Ali et al., 2011; Sulaeman and Wei, 2018).
Abnormal returns
We use the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) as our main benchmarks to estimate
abnormal returns. For each firm i and month t we estimate the abnormal return
from regressing each month excess return on the monthly market (Rm-Rf), the
size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentun (WML) factors using the 60
previous months of data:
Ri,t−rf = αi,t+βMKT (RM,t−rf )+βSMBSMBt+βHMLHMLt+βWMLWMLt+i,t
(3.3)
and calculate the abnormal returns, AR4f , as the difference between the actual
return and the return predicted by the model. We then aggregate the returns
quarterly to get the cumulative return around the quarter of the shock CAR4fq ,
where q = 0, (−1, 0), (−1, 1), where q are quarters relative to the event quarter.
We use consider the market model as an alternative benchmark to check the ro-
bustness of the results, and estimate the monthly abnormal returns, ARmm, and
the cumulative abnormal returns, CARmmq , where q = 0, (−1, 0), (−1, 1).
Accounting quality
Our benchmark proxy for earnings quality is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002)
model, which captures the extent to which working capital accruals map into cash-
flows from operations. We follow McNichols (2002) to augment their model to
include the change in revenue and property, plant and equipment. This proxy has
been widely used in the literature (Francis et al., 2005; Biddle et al., 2009), which
increases comparability with prior studies. It basically captures uncertainty in
accruals quality (Francis et al., 2005; Hilary, 2008), and we believe it best capture
the uncertainty perceived by investors when using accounting information to asses
the value of a firm.
Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimate their model regressing total accruals (earn-
ings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat, ibc) mi-
nus the operating cash flows (Compustat, oancf) in year t), on cash from operating
activities (Compustat, oancf) relative to total assets (Compustat, at) in years t,
t + 1 and t − 1. Following McNichols (2002) we include the change in revenues
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(Compustat, revt) and property, plant and equipment (Compustat, ppegt) as ad-
ditional explanatory variables in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The model
is estimated for each year-industry (defined by the Fama and French 48 industry
groups) with at least 20 observations, to obtain a firm- and year-specific estimation
of the residuals. The accruals quality proxy, AQ DD MN , is the standard devia-
tion of the residuals from the previous regressions over the past 5 years, multiplied
by minus one, so that the higher AQ DD MN , the higher the accounting quality.
For robustness, we also consider the unadjusted Dechow and Dichev (2002) proxy,
AQ DD.
In additional tests we use conditional conservatism as an alternative proxy
for accounting quality. We follow Khan and Watts (2009) in the construction
of the variable. This measure is based on Basu (1997) but it overcomes some
of its limitations by taking into account how firm specific characteristics affect
conditional conservatism over time. We consider two alternative proxies: the C-
Score, C Score, and the total score, Total Score, that is the sum of the C-Score
and the G-Score.7 Conservatism is increasing in both variables.
Finally, to control for outliers and non-linearities and facilitate the economic
interpretation of the results we use deciles of the proxies of earnings quality and
accounting conservatism (see for instance Francis et al., 2005).
Control variables
We create our plausible exogenous proxy for price pressure based on trading by
distressed mutual funds. However, conditional on suffering the exogenous shock,
the higher the fraction of distressed trades, the higher the expected mispricing.
We therefore control for Pressure in all our regressions, constructed following
Equation 3.2.
We also include a set of control variables that might affect stock returns, fol-
lowing Ben-Rephael et al. (2017b). We control for firm size measured as the nat-
ural logarithm of stock market capitalization, MktCap (Compustat, csho*prcc f),
growth opportunities calculated as the natural logarithm of the book-to-market
ratio and Mkt to Book (Compustat, (at+(csho*prcc f)-ceq-txdb)/at). Financial
variables are calculated at the end of the previous fiscal year. We also control
for institutional ownership measured as the fraction of shares outstanding owned
by institutional investors at the beginning of the quarter of the shock, InstHold
(Thomson Reuters, instown perc), and analysts coverage measured by the natural
logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing EPS forecasts for the most
recent fiscal year, LnNumEst (IBES, numest).
7Following previous literature, we consider the three-year average of these variables
(Garc´ıa-Lara et al., 2016).
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In robustness tests we also consider a set of market-based variables calculated
from monthly data and aggregated at the quarter level. We measure these variables
with two lags to avoid the bad controls problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In
particular, the drop in the stock price might start before the event quarter, as
suggested by Coval and Stafford (2007) and shown in Figure 1, and therefore using
only one lag might be problematic. We follow Ben-Rephael et al. (2017b) in the
selection and construction of these variables. We include the abnormal trading
volume calculated as the stock trading volume divided by the average trading
volume of the previous year, AV ol (CRSP, vol), the ratio of the stock high and
low price difference and the high price, HLtoH (CRSP, (askhi-bidlo)/askhi), the
average raw return, Ret (CRSP, retx), stock liquidity measured as the monthly
stock turnover, Turnover (CRSP, vol/shrout), the stock spread, Spread (CRSP,
(ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2)), and the standard deviation of stock returns, SDRet
(CRSP, retx).
Finally, more complex firms might have worse accruals quality simply because
the accounting process cannot accurately capture firms fundamentals, which ulti-
mately, might affect investors ability to price firms (Barinov et al., 2016). Building
on Dechow and Dichev (2002), we control for cash flow volatility, S CFO (Com-
pustat, oancf), sales volatility, S Sales (Compustat, sale),8 firm operating cycle,
OperCycle (Compustat, (rect/sale)+(invt/cogs)), and the incidence of negative
earnings over the past 10 years, NegEarn (Compustat, ib).9
3.2.3 Empirical Framework
We use an event study methodology to examine whether accounting quality affects
underpricing. Specifically, we run the following cross-sectional pooled regression:
CARi = βAQi + γControlsi + i (3.4)
where CARi is the abnormal return of firm i around the quarter of the shock.
AQ denotes the accounting quality of firm i in the previous fiscal year. Following
Ben-Rephael et al. (2017b) and Hilary (2008), we include a set of control variables,
Controls, that might affect returns: firm size, book-to-market ratio, institutional
ownership, and analysts coverage (see Section 3.2.2). All continuous variables
8Cash flow and sales volatility are normalized by total assets, and estimated over a
window of 10 years, with at least 5 observations per firm.
9Dechow and Dichev (2002) also control for firm size using the natural logarithm of
total assets. We do not include this control because we re already controlling for market
capitalization in all the regressions, and these variables are highly correlated. In untabu-
lated tests we find that the result do not vary when we use total assets instead of market
capitalization.
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are winsorized to avoid the influence of outliers. We also include quarter-year
and industry (defined by the Fama and French 48 industry groups) fixed-effects.
The coefficient of interest is β and captures whether accounting quality impacts
stock returns around exogenous price pressures, and we expect it to be negative.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 1 presents the monthly abnormal returns (top) and the cumulative re-
turns (bottom) around the event quarter. Firms are grouped into those with high
(continuous line, High AQ) and low (dashed line, Low AQ) accounting quality,
according to the augmented McNichols (2002) model. The figure at the bottom
shows that the mispricing is only temporarily, and that eventually all firms re-
turn to their fundamental value (zero cumulative abnormal return). This is an
important preliminary result because we argue that the mispricing around mutual
fund fire sales is unrelated to firms prospects. If they were due to fundamental,
we should not observe a reversion of abnormal returns and our analysis could be
more likely to suffer from endogeneity concerns. Figure 1 provides a clear overview
of the main result of the paper: firms with better accounting quality have lower
deviation from fundamental value, on average. The underpricing is deeper for
firms with lower reporting quality, and it also last longer.10 The CAR in the quar-
ter of the shock (shaded area) between high and low accounting quality firms are
statistically different, and lower for the latter.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the full sample (Columns (1) to (6)) and
the subsamples of high and low accounting quality (Columns (7)-(8) and (9)-(10),
respectively). Data requirements to calculate the proxies for accounting quality
and the abnormal returns bias our sample towards firms that are larger and more
successful compared to the average firm in Compustat, a limitation that has been
already pointed out in previous studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2005). The mean firm
in our sample has a size, measure by the natural logarithm of total assets (market
capitalization), of 6.6 (6.8), while the mean firm in Compustat has a size of 5.5
(5.2).11 Regarding the market-to-book ratio, firms in our sample have a lower
10We do not exploit variations in the duration of the mispricing in this paper because it
is difficult to define a starting date for the mispricing, as previous papers document that
it can start well before the quarter of the shock if mutual funds anticipate outflows, and
start selling in advance (Coval and Stafford, 2007).
11Summary statistics for the Compustat sample are untabulated, but they are available
upon request.
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mean but a higher median compared to Compustat firms.
Our sample includes firms with better accounting quality compared to the
full Compustat sample for which we can compute these proxies. It could be that
mutual funds, realizing that selling hard-to-price stocks will have a higher impact
on price, might decide to sell easy-to-price stocks first.12 Columns (7) and (9) also
support this argument: while 4,083 firms are classified as High AQ, only 1,770 firms
belong to the Low AQ group. The mean values of the C Score and Total Score
are similar to those in the full Compustat sample.
Regarding the abnormal returns around mutual fund fire sales, we find that in
the event quarter high (low) accounting quality firms suffer four factor (market)
abnormal return of 0.96% (-4.2%), or -1.59% (-7.37%) during the event quarter
and the previous one. Given our focus on recent years, it is not surprising that
the abnormal returns presented in Table 1 are significantly lower than those doc-
umented in previous papers (e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007; Sulaeman and Wei,
2018), as academic research tends to destroy stock return predictability (McLean
and Pontiff, 2016). All in all, these statistics are consistent with the preliminary
conclusions drawn from Figure 1 and point to the positive effect of accounting
quality on stock returns when firms suffer from exogenous shocks to the stock
price. Investors might take longer to disentangle the temporary mispricing from
fundamental information in low accounting quality firms, further depressing stock
prices (even though firms eventually return to fundamental value). In the rest of
the paper we provide formal tests to further support our findings.
The rest of the summary statistics presented in Table 1 are consistent with
recent studies exploiting this kind of mispricing (e.g., Kadach, 2017; Sulaeman
and Wei, 2018).
3.3.2 Main results
Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. In columns (1) to (3) account-
ing quality is measured using the augmented McNichols (2002) model, while in
Columns (4) to (6) we use the unadjusted Dechow and Dichev (2002) proxy. The
table confirms the findings presented in Figure 1: firms with better accounting
quality have higher cumulative abnormal returns when they suffer exogenous price
pressures. In other words, accounting quality attenuates the (exogenous) mispric-
ing. The result is robust to alternative definitions of accounting quality, different
12This result contradicts Coval and Stafford (2007) which finds that mutual fund do not
mitigate the costs of their fire trades by selling larger, more liquid or better performing
assets first. This conflicting result might be explained by the particularities of our sample
size mentioned above, or by mutual funds learning through academic research (McLean
and Pontiff, 2016).
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event windows (0, (-1,0) and (-1,1)), alternative models to estimate abnormal re-
turns (see Panel B), firm-level controls, industry and time fixed effects.
Regarding the economic magnitude of the effect, an increase of one decile in
our main proxy for of accounting quality, Decile DD MN , increases the CAR by
0.255% in the quarter of the shock, 0.603% when including the previous quarter,
and 0.708% in the broader even window, (-1,1). Compared to the unconditional
mean, these results are substantial, representing a 17% to 20% reduction in the
mispricing during those event windows. The effect is somehow smaller when ac-
counting quality is measured using Decile DD but remains significant after in-
cluding a wide set of control variables. The results are qualitatively similar (and
statistically stronger) when we use the market model to estimate abnormal returns
(Panel B).
We find that the significance of the control variables is, in general, weaker than
that for accounting quality, consistent with Hilary (2008). In particular, Pressure,
the fraction of the average trading volume that is fire sold in the quarter of the
shock, is negative (as expected), but it is not significant in all the specifications.
Moreover, we control for institutional ownership, InstHold, and analysts coverage,
LnNumEst, that previous papers consider as alternative corporate governance
mechanisms (Biddle et al., 2009; Garc´ıa-Lara et al., 2016). Including this variables
reduces concerns that the proxies for accounting quality might indeed be capturing
the effect of governance mechanisms that are, in general, associated with reporting
quality.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the fraction of institutional investors ownership
is negative, and is the only variable that remains statistically significant in (al-
most) all regressions, and has the highest economic magnitude among the control
variables. This result might seem surprising, because institutional investors are
considered sophisticated shareholders, and therefore, they are expected to mitigate
the effect of the exogenous mispricing. To the contrary, the negative coefficients
suggest that they exacerbate the effect. Dennis and Strickland (2002) find that
institutional investors herd together and trade with the momentum, contributing
to market volatility, which is consistent with our finding.
Analysts are also considered informed stakeholders, and a higher number of an-
alysts following the firm would be expected to reduce the mispricing through the
fastest incorporation of news into prices. However, we find that the coefficient on
LnNumEst, is negative, and in general, it is statistically insignificant. Sulaeman
and Wei (2018) document that only 11 to 13% of analysts can identify mispric-
ings caused by mutual fund liquidity needs. In other words, not all analysts are
skilled, and therefore, increasing the number of analysts following the firm does not
guarantee a reduction in asymmetric information, at least when firms experience
shocks that are unrelated to fundamentals.
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In Panels A, B and C of Table 3 we next check whether our results are robust to
the inclusion of additional controls (Ben-Rephael et al., 2017b), to non-parametric
estimation (Hilary, 2008), and to the exclusion of financial (SIC 6), regulated (SIC
49) and quasi-governamental (SIC 9) firms (Hilary, 2008), respectively. For the
sake of brevity we only report results when the dependent variable is the abnormal
return measured using the four factor model. However, the results are qualitatively
the same (and statistically stronger) when using the market model (available upon
request). In Panel A we include a set of additional controls that might be correlated
with the dependent variable. We follow Ben-Rephael et al. (2017b) in the election
for these additional market-level controls, AV ol, HLtoH, Ret, Turnover, Spread,
and SDRet. Overall the results indicate that the inclusion of these variables
reduces the significance of the coefficients but they do not significantly affect the
economic magnitude. However, one comment is in order. We show in Figure 1
that the drop in the stock price starts well before the event quarter, consistent
with Coval and Stafford (2007). To mitigate the bad-controls problem (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008), we estimate these variables with two lags. Still some concerns
might remain that these explanatory variables are, indeed affected by the shock,
and therefore we do not include them in our main specifications.
In Panel B, we present the results when using median regression. This spec-
ification has some advantages over OLS, such as being more robust to outliers,
and avoiding assumptions about the distribution of the errors. The results pre-
sented in Panel B show that both the economic and the statistical significance are
larger when we regress in the median rather than the mean, consistent with Hi-
lary (2008). Finally, in Panel C we show that the results are qualitatively similar
when we exclude financial, regulated and quasi-governmental firms, and the eco-
nomic magnitude remains fairly stable across the different specifications. Overall
we can conclude that the higher the mapping of accruals to cash flows, the lower
the mispricing when mutual funds are fire selling the stock due to liquidity needs,
consistent with financial reports being more useful to investors to price firms.
In untabulated results we also find that the coefficients remain significant after
controlling for industry x quarter fixed effects, which suggests that within the same
industry, and the same quarter, firms with higher accounting quality have lower
deviations from fundamental value. In other words, these additional tests allow us
to exclude the possibility that other confounding factors that do not vary within
industry-quarter are driving the results.
3.3.3 Firm complexity
Prior research shows that firm complexity makes it more difficult for market par-
ticipant to understand and incorporate firm specific information into prices. For
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instance, Barinov et al. (2016) find that conglomerates have a larger post earnings
announcement drift compared to single-segment firms. Cohen and Lou (2012) doc-
ument that when there is an information event that affects an entire industry, firms
that operate solely in that industry incorporate news into prices faster compared
to a firm operating in multiple industries.
We want to rule out the possibility that our proxy for accruals quality might
be capturing firm complexity, rather than the extent to which accruals map into
cash-flows, and therefore to firm price. We follow Francis et al. (2005) and con-
trol for the innate components of accruals, i.e., firm economic fundamentals: the
length of the operating cycle, the volatility of sales and cash flows and the inci-
dence of losses over the last 10 years. In addition, we control for firm size in all
our regressions. All these factors are expected to hinder accruals ability to cap-
ture economic fundamentals, leading to a reduction in accounting quality that is
unrelated to managerial decisions.
The results are presented in Table 4 and show that the effect of accounting
quality on stock mispricing remain economic and statistically significant after con-
trolling for several determinants of firm complexity.13 The inclusion of these ad-
ditional controls mainly attenuate the impact of accounting quality in the quarter
of the shock when we measure cumulative abnormal returns using the four-factor
model, but not so in the broader event windows. However, non of these controls
have a larger and consistent explanatory power, compared to accounting quality.
In general the estimates are negative (as expected) but statistically insignificant.
In untabulated results we find that estimates are economically and statisti-
cally stronger when we estimate the above specifications using median regression.
Moreover, the coefficient on NegEarn is larger and statistically significant at the
1% level in all six specifications. The results on the remaining control variables are
qualitatively the same. Finally, when we exclude financial, regulated and quasi-
governamental firms the estimates remain fairly stable, and the all the results
discussed above hold (untabulated).
Overall, we conclude that, while firm complexity might affect market partici-
pants ability to price securities, in the presence of exogenous price pressures caused
by mutual fund liquidity needs, accounting quality plays an important and distinct
role in enhancing market efficiency. Our results seem not to be driven by innate
factors that might hinder financial reports ability to convey information about firm
fundamentals.
13All the regressions include the controls included in the benchmark specification (pres-
sure, institutional ownership, analysts coverage, market-to-book ratio) but we do not
present them in the table to save space.
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3.4 Additional tests
3.4.1 Alternative proxies for accounting quality
In this section we explore whether our findings hold when using alternative proxies
for accounting quality. Previous literature suggests that accounting conservatism
is a desirable property of financial reporting as it provides a hard benchmark to
evaluate firm performance, imposing more severe verifiability requirements for the
recognition of gains compared to losses (Basu, 1997; LaFond and Watts, 2008). The
empirical evidence shows that conservatism enhances investment efficiency, reduc-
ing underinvestment (Garc´ıa-Lara et al., 2016) but also overinvestment (Francis
and Martin, 2010). Building on this literature, we expect to find that firms that
are more conservative would have lower deviations from fundamental value when
an exogenous shock temporarily depresses stock prices.
The proxy for conditional conservatism is constructed following Khan and
Watts (2009), and it is explained in Section 3.2.2. The results are presented in
Table 5. In Panel A we present the results for the benchmark model, and show
that conditional conservatism reduces stock mispricing during mutual fund fire
sales, but the coefficients are only statistically significant for the broader event
window (see Table 2 for comparison). The estimated coefficients are statistically
(and in general, economically) stronger when we use median estimation instead
of OLS regressions. These results are presented in Panel B and suggests that the
presence of outliers might be biasing against finding a result in Panel A. Even
though the economic significance is smaller when we proxy for accounting quality
using conditional conservatism compared to accruals quality, the overall effect is
still sizable: moving from one decile to the following one increases CAR by 18%
compared to the unconditional mean.
To sum up, we conclude that having more conservative financial reporting also
alleviate the mispricing caused by mutual fund fire sales, at least in the broader
event window. While we cannot confidently conclude that it significantly reduces
the deviation before and during the shock, we can conclude that accounting con-
servatism helps firm returning to fundamental value faster in the aftermath of the
shock.
3.4.2 Multiple shocks
One potential concern regarding the empirical strategy followed along the paper
is that the results might be driven by firms suffering multiple continuous shocks.
To address this issue, for each firm with more than one shock in the same year we
keep only the first observation, and drop the remaining ones. The results using
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this reduced sample are presented in Table 6. In Panel A we present the results
for the main proxies for accounting quality, Decile DD MN (McNichols, 2002)
and Decile DD (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), and in Panel B we exhibit the results
for accounting conservatism, Decile CScore and Decile TCons (Khan and Watts,
2009).
The results presented in Table 6 are qualitatively the same after excluding
multiple shocks. Both the economic and the statistical significance are fairly stable
compared to the benchmark results (see Tables 2 and 4 for comparison). To ensure
that these results are robust, we re-run the regressions including the additional
market-based and firm complexity controls, exclude financial, regulated and quasi-
governmental firms, use median regression and all the aforementioned conclusions
hold. Overall, the results are stronger when we use the augmented McNichols
(2002) proxy for accounting quality, and for the broader event window.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper shows that accounting quality plays a very important role in stock
valuation when firms suffer from exogenous underpricing caused by mutual funds
liquidity needs that temporarily deviate prices from fundamental value. We find
that, in this setting, firms with better accounting quality have a lower price impact,
exhibiting less negative cumulative abnormal returns. We show that the results
are not driven by firm complexity, and are robust to a wide set of robustness tests.
Overall, we conclude that having better accounting quality reduces mispricing in
setting in which other market participants cannot timely react to support stock
prices.
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns around mutual funds fire sales
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The figures show the abnormal returns (Panel A) and cumulative abnormal returns (Panel
B) for firms with high (High AQ) and low (Low AQ) accounting quality. The former
includes firms in the first and second quintiles, while Low AQ includes firms in the fourth
and fifth quintiles of AQ DD MN (McNichols, 2002). The horizontal axes represent the
quarters relative to the event, and the event goes from [-2,0] (shaded).
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Table1:Summarystatistics
Fulsample HighAQ LowAQ
n Mean S.D. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 n Mdn n Mdn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AQDDMN 7775 -0.283 0.399 -0.336 -0.201 -0.120 4083 -0.12 1770 -0.52
AQDD 7775 -0.129 0.248 -0.152 -0.091 -0.053 4083 -0.06 1770 -0.21
CScore 6712 0.111 0.065 0.072 0.113 0.150 3588 0.11 1424 0.13
TotalScore 6712 0.122 0.051 0.091 0.125 0.155 3588 0.12 1424 0.14
CARmm0 7775 -1.510 17.18 -11.37 -1.599 8.34 4083 -1.08 1770 -3.09
CAR4f0 7775 -1.937 18.09 -12.18 -1.896 7.97 4083 -0.96 1770 -4.21CARmm1,0 7775 -2.698 23.45 -16.16 -2.414 10.64 4083 -1.25 1770 -5.18
CAR4f1,0 7775 -3.474 24.53 -17.89 -3.295 10.30 4083 -1.59 1770 -7.37CARmm1,1 7775 -2.322 28.20 -18.30 -2.328 13.69 4083 -0.99 1770 -6.00
CAR4f1,1 7775 -3.463 29.88 -20.31 -3.166 12.81 4083 -0.98 1770 -8.89Pressure 7775 1.856 1.350 0.870 1.380 2.410 4083 1.32 1770 1.45
MktCap 7775 6.759 1.454 5.751 6.651 7.681 4083 7.08 1770 5.94
Mkt toBook 7775 0.530 0.498 0.170 0.437 0.805 4083 0.43 1770 0.51
Size 7775 6.635 1.495 5.604 6.546 7.561 4083 6.98 1770 5.70
OperCycle 7672 141.6 236.5 71.6 113.2 164.6 4030 114 1743 110
SCFO 7747 0.075 0.202 0.033 0.051 0.078 4067 0.04 1766 0.09
SSales 7747 0.216 0.195 0.103 0.165 0.269 4067 0.13 1766 0.25
NegEarn 7775 0.194 0.242 0.000 0.100 0.300 4083 0.00 1770 0.30
InstHold 7775 0.723 0.206 0.601 0.758 0.872 4083 0.78 1770 0.70
LnNumEst 7775 1.863 0.705 1.386 1.792 2.398 4083 1.95 1770 1.61
AVol 7617 1.050 0.412 0.804 0.979 1.199 3998 0.99 1731 0.94
HLtoH 7774 0.128 0.063 0.085 0.114 0.153 4083 0.10 1769 0.14
Ret 7770 1.231 4.833 -1.254 1.220 3.733 4083 1.22 1767 1.39
Turnover 7618 1.745 1.238 0.900 1.430 2.225 3999 1.38 1732 1.58
Spread 7774 0.253 0.544 0.056 0.117 0.240 4083 0.10 1769 0.17
SDRet 7770 0.103 0.059 0.064 0.089 0.126 4083 0.08 1767 0.11
Columns(1)to(5)presentsummarystatisticsforthefulsample. Columns(6)-(7)and(8)-(9)show
summarystatisticsforthesubsampleofhighandlowaccountingquality,respectively(HighAQ(LowAQ)
includesﬁrmsintheﬁrstandsecond(fourthandﬁfth)quintilesofAQDDMN).AQ DDandAQDDMN
areDechowandDichev(2002)and McNichols(2002)proxiesforearningsquality,respectively. CScore
andTotalScoreareKhanand Watts(2009)proxiesforaccountingconservatism.CARktisthecumulativeabnormalreturnforwindowtaroundtheevent(t=0,(−1,0),(−1,1))using modelj(k= mm,4f).
PressureisconstructedfolowingEquation3.2.MktCap (Size)isthenaturallogarithmofstockmarket
capitalization(totalassets),Mkt toBookisthenaturallogarithmofthebook-to-marketratio.OperCycle
isthelengthoftheoperatingcycle,SCFO(SSales)isthevolatilityofcashﬂows(sales),andNegEarn
istheincidenceofnegativeearnings.InstHoldisthefractionofsharesownedbyinstitutionalinvestors,
andLnNumEstisthelogofoneplusthenumberofanalystsissuingEPSforecasts.AVolistheabnormal
tradingvolume,HLtoH istheratioofthestockhighandlowpricediﬀerenceandthehighprice,Retis
theaveragerawreturn,Turnoveristhemonthlystockturnover,Spreadisthestockspread,andSDRet
isthestandarddeviationofstockreturns.
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Table2:Theeﬀectofaccountingqualityonstock mispricing
Panel A:Fourfactor model
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.255 0.603 0.708
(2.539) (4.175) (3.753)
DecileDD 0.157 0.418 0.636
(1.560) (2.901) (3.433)
Pressure -0.227 -0.631 -0.345 -0.224 -0.624 -0.337
(-1.236) (-2.604) (-1.172) (-1.218) (-2.576) (-1.147)
MktCap -0.052 0.205 0.123 0.026 0.350 0.177
(-0.215) (0.612) (0.292) (0.106) (1.028) (0.414)
Mkt toBook -0.747 0.792 0.484 -0.845 0.608 0.415
(-1.416) (1.059) (0.468) (-1.598) (0.814) (0.402)
InstHold -3.723 -2.785 -5.091 -3.697 -2.746 -5.122
(-3.091) (-1.627) (-2.293) (-3.065) (-1.602) (-2.305)
LnNumEst -0.283 -1.344 -0.972 -0.301 -1.370 -0.953
(-0.615) (-2.013) (-1.127) (-0.651) (-2.041) (-1.099)
Firms 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Observations 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775
Adj.R2 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.017
PanelB: Market model
CARmm0 CARmm1,0 CARmm1,1 CARmm0 CARmm1,0 CARmm1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.404 0.889 1.134
(3.886) (5.980) (5.860)
DecileDD 0.290 0.613 0.920
(2.763) (4.127) (4.752)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Observations 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775
Adj.R2 0.044 0.054 0.064 0.043 0.051 0.062
Thistablereportstheresultsoftheeﬀectofaccountingqualityonstockmispricing.InPanelA(Panel
B)theabnormalreturnsarecalculatedusingthefourfactormodel(marketmodel). Columns(1)to(3)
presenttheresultsfortheaugmented McNichols(2002)model,andColumns(4)to(6)showtheresults
forthe(unmodiﬁed)DechowandDichev(2002)model.Alregressionsincludeindustryandquarter-year
ﬁxedeﬀects.Robustt-valuesarereportedbelowthecoeﬃcientestimates.
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Table3: Robustnesstests
Panel A: Additional market-basedcontrols
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.182 0.504 0.630
(1.729) (3.330) (3.190)
DecileDD 0.098 0.320 0.564
(0.951) (2.184) (2.987)
Observations 7,614 7,614 7,614 7,614 7,614 7,614
Adj.R2 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.019
PanelB: Medianregressions
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.391 0.667 0.745
(4.208) (4.902) (5.040)
DecileDD 0.313 0.538 0.827
(3.407) (3.919) (5.658)
Observations 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775 7,775
PseudoR-sq. 0.015 0.020 0.020 0.014 0.019 0.020
PanelC:Excludingﬁnancial,regulatedandquasi-governamentalﬁrms
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.240 0.583 0.678
(2.325) (3.891) (3.488)
DecileDD 0.131 0.385 0.612
(1.260) (2.576) (3.199)
Observations 7,337 7,337 7,337 7,337 7,337 7,337
Adj.R2 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.017
Thistablepresentsrobustnessteststothe mainresultsofthepaper.InPanelAweincludeasetof
marketbasedcontrols(AVol,HLtoH,Ret,Turnover,SpreadandSDRet)thatmightpotentialyaﬀect
abnormalreturns(Ben-Rephaeletal.,2017b).InPanelBweshowtheresultsusingmedianregressions
toaccountfornon-normalerrorsandoutliers(Hilary,2008).InPanelCweexcludeﬁnancial(SIC6),
regulated(SIC49)andquasi-governamental(SIC9)ﬁrms(Hilary,2008). Alregressionsincludeﬁrms
controlsandindustryandtimeﬁxedeﬀects.Robustt-valuesarereportedbelowthecoeﬃcientestimates.
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Table4: Accountingqualityorﬁrmcomplexity?
Panel A:Fourfactor modelandﬁrmcomplexity
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.197 0.523 0.628
(1.808) (3.354) (3.055)
DecileDD 0.088 0.309 0.536
(0.826) (2.032) (2.785)
MktCap -0.141 0.058 0.005 -0.091 0.150 0.028
(-0.575) (0.168) (0.012) (-0.368) (0.432) (0.063)
OperCycle -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(-0.081) (0.364) (-0.434) (-0.043) (0.455) (-0.364)
SCFO -0.078 -0.605 0.330 -0.052 -0.502 0.531
(-0.081) (-0.417) (0.129) (-0.053) (-0.338) (0.204)
SSales -0.725 0.446 -1.248 -1.116 -0.455 -2.025
(-0.562) (0.234) (-0.489) (-0.891) (-0.244) (-0.817)
NegEarn -1.557 -3.204 -2.863 -1.835 -3.773 -3.169
(-1.330) (-1.887) (-1.275) (-1.562) (-2.216) (-1.422)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014
Observations 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644
Adj.R2 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.016
PanelB: Market modelandﬁrmcomplexity
CARmm0 CARmm1,0 CARmm1,1 CARmm0 CARmm1,0 CARmm1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.341 0.805 1.014
(3.001) (4.992) (4.768)
DecileDD 0.203 0.477 0.751
(1.822) (3.049) (3.705)
Firmcomplexity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644
Adj.R2 0.046 0.056 0.065 0.045 0.053 0.063
Inthistablewecontrolforﬁrmcomplexityproxiedbythelengthoftheoperatingcycle,volatilityofcash
ﬂows,volatilityofsales,theincidenceofnegativeearningsoverthepast10years(Francisetal.,2005). We
alsocontrolforﬁrmsizeusing MktCap.InPanelA(PanelB)thedependentvariableisthecumulative
abnormalreturnusingthefourfactor(market)model. Alregressionsincludeindustryandquarter-year
ﬁxedeﬀects.Robustt-valuesarereportedbelowthecoeﬃcientestimates.
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Table5: Accountingconservatismandstock mispricing
Panel A:Baseline model
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileCScore 0.119 0.263 0.747
(0.734) (1.141) (2.501)
DecileTCons 0.079 0.414 0.927
(0.401) (1.472) (2.533)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,711 6,711 6,711 6,711 6,711 6,711
Adj.R2 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.016
PanelB: Medianregressions
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileCScore 0.208 0.521 0.612
(1.685) (2.734) (2.912)
DecileTCons 0.175 0.597 0.732
(1.214) (2.692) (2.929)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,712 6,712 6,712 6,712 6,712 6,712
PseudoR-sq. 0.015 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.020
PanelC:Firmcomplexity
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileCScore 0.148 0.340 0.804
(0.903) (1.472) (2.697)
DecileTCons 0.119 0.508 0.993
(0.603) (1.800) (2.715)
Firmcomplexity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611
Adj.R2 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.018
Thistablepresentstheresultswhenweuseaccountingconservatismasanalternativeproxyforaccounting
quality.InPanelAwepresenttheresultsforthebaselineregression,inPanelBweshowthe median
regressionresults,andinPanelCwealsocontrolforﬁrmcomplexity.Alregressionsincludeindustryand
quarter-yearﬁxedeﬀects.Robustt-valuesarereportedbelowthecoeﬃcientestimates.
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Table6: Additionaltests- Multipleshocks
Panel A:Earningsquality
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileDDMN 0.300 0.573 0.814
(2.228) (3.241) (3.751)
DecileDD 0.066 0.270 0.693
(0.481) (1.474) (3.116)
Observations 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323
R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.015
PanelB: Accountingconservatism
CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1 CAR4f0 CAR4f1,0 CAR4f1,1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DecileCScore 0.132 0.122 0.773
(0.626) (0.428) (2.231)
DecileTCons 0.151 0.285 0.988
(0.570) (0.811) (2.313)
Observations 3,684 3,684 3,684 3,684 3,684 3,684
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011
Thistableshowstheresultswhen multipleshockinthesameyeararedropped. PanelApresentsthe
resultsforthealternativeproxiesofearningsquality(DecileDDMNandDecile DD),andPanelBshows
theestimatesforaccountingconservatism(DecileCScoreandDecileTotalScore).Alregressionsinclude
industryandquarter-yearﬁxedeﬀects.Robustt-valuesarereportedbelowthecoeﬃcientestimates. Al
regressioncoeﬃcientsarestandardized.
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Chapter 4
Appendix to Chapter 2
A A Simple Model
This Appendix presents a simple asymmetric information model with a numerical example
to illustrate how actual repurchases can be used by good firms to signal their type. The
model closely follows Tirole (2010).1
Assumptions and notation
The model has two periods. At t = 0, firms have liquid assets, A, that can be used to
repurchase stock, or they can keep them until t = 1, to invest. For simplicity, I assume
that firms either use all available cash to repurchase shares or repurchase nothing. There
is one project available to all firms at t = 1 that requires an initial investment, I > A, and
will generate two random payoffs at t = 2, R with probability pi and 0 with probability
(1− pi). There are two types of firms, good (G) and bad (B), and they differ only in the
probability of success, pG > pB . There is a fraction α of good firms and a fraction (1−α)
of bad firms. Assume that pGR > I −A (at least the good type is creditworthy).
There is asymmetric information at t = 0 and t = 1 regarding firm type. Risk-neutral
managers run the firm, and they know the type of their firm. They are compensated
with a fraction, δ, of the firm at t = 0, and they cannot trade their shares until t = 2.2
1See Chapter 6, Corporate Financing Under Asymmetric Information.
2It could instead be assumed that managers can sell their stake in the firms and in-
vestors can observe their trades; therefore, investors will infer that the firm is bad (good)
if managers are selling (buying) because the firm is overvalued (undervalued). In this case,
insider trading rather than stock repurchases would be the signaling device. I empirically
test whether insider purchases are driving the results in Section 2.4. Notice, however, that
insiders are subject to stricter trade disclosure requirements than are firms, thereby making
stock repurchases more attractive mechanisms to engage in indirect insider trading (Fried,
2014). Moreover, even when insider purchases could substitute for stock repurchases as
a signaling device, diversification motives and financial constraints could prevent insiders
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Because δ is constant over time, the maximization of the manager’s utility is equivalent
to maximizing the firm’s equity value. I assume that investors are rational, risk neutral,
and know the probability distribution of firms’ types, i.e., the fraction of good and bad
firms, and their probability of success, but they cannot distinguish an individual firm’s
type. Consequently, they will break even on average. The investors’ prior probability of
success is m = αpG + (1 − α)pB . The number of shares outstanding is normalized to 1,
and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.
At t = 1, firms go to the capital markets to raise money to invest in the project,3 and
they have to disclose in their financial statements the number of shares repurchased and
the price paid at t = 0. Investors might infer the firm’s type from its repurchase activity:
they observe the repurchase price, and they infer that if the price is sufficiently high, the
company must be good. The timing of events is described in Figure A1.
Asymmetric information
Firms’ types: G or B
Firms have liquid assets, A
Firms repurchase stock {0, A}
0
Asymmetric information
Investment project
I > A
Firms have to borrow
Repurchases revealed
1
The project yields:
R with Pr = pi
0 with Pr = 1− pi
2
Figure A1: Timeline
Perfect information equilibrium
I will first analyze the perfect information case without repurchases, to set a benchmark (of
course, the result will be the same with repurchases, as there are no frictions in this case
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961)). At t = 0, firms do nothing,
and, at t = 1 the good firm obtains financing. One optimal arrangement is to secure
financing in case of success, RG, consistent with the investors’ break even condition:
4
pG(R−RG) = I −A (A.1)
from buying firm shares.
3All firms have to borrow regardless of the payout decision because liquid assets are
insufficient to finance the project (I > A).
4There is an indeterminacy on the firm compensation with perfect information, and
contracts in which the firm receives a positive compensation in the case of failure are
possible. However, in the asymmetric information case a contract that rewards the firm
only in the case of success best reflects the good firm comparative advantage, as it is more
likely to succeed than the bad one (Tirole, 2010). Therefore, choosing this contract here
case eases the comparison with the asymmetric information setting.
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If pBR < I − A, at t = 1, the bad firm cannot secure financing because it does not
have enough pledgeable income. If pBR < I − A, the bad firm optimal arrangement, is
pB(R − RB) = I − A in the event of success, and zero in the case of failure. Therefore,
the firm’s equity value is
Vi = piR− I +A. (A.2)
It is clear from Equation A.2 that the value of good firms will be higher than the
value of bad firms because pG > pB . Consider next the case with stock repurchases and
symmetric information. At t = 0, firms use all cash available to repurchase shares (a
fraction, β, of shares outstanding), and at t = 1, they have to borrow I to invest. The
borrowers’ contract is Ri = R− I/pi, and the firm’s equity value is as follows:
V
′
i =
piR− I
1− βi . (A.3)
Then, the firm’s value will be equal to the benchmark if and only if βi = A/(piR− I+A),
that is, if the firms repurchase shares at the fundamental value.
Numerical Example. Consider the following numerical example. The probability of
success for good and bad firms is pG = 0.8 and pG = 0.5, respectively. Firms have cash on
hand A = 1 and the project requires an investment of I = 2 and it will yield R = 5 in case
of success. The proportion of good firms is α = 0.5. Under symmetric information, from
Equation A.2 the firm’s equity value is VG = 3, VB = 1.5, that is exactly the value with
stock repurchases if good and bad firms repurchase 0.33 and 0.66 of shares outstanding
with the cash available, respectively. That is, with cash equal to 1, and a firm value of 3,
the firm can repurchase 1/3 of the shares outstanding at the fundamental value, while the
bad firm can repurchase 1/1.5.
Asymmetric information equilibria
In the asymmetric information case (without repurchases), the standard result implies
that, if firms cannot differentiate themselves, there will be cross-subsidization or market
breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). If firms are creditworthy on average, mR > I −A, in equilib-
rium, investors break even, and the firm is compensated with zero in the case of failure,
and RP in the event of success, such that
m(R−RP ) = I −A (A.4)
Then, the firm’s equity value in the pooling equilibrium, V Pi , will be
V Pi = pi(R−
I −A
m
). (A.5)
It is straightforward that VG ≥ V PG ≥ V PB ≥ VB because pG/m > 1 > pB/m. If mR <
I − A, there is market breakdown (no lending), even when some firms are creditworthy,
i.e., there is underinvestment.
Under asymmetric information, both good and bad firms will be traded at the cross-
sectional average, VCS . In this case, VCS = αVG + (1 − α)VB , and good firms are un-
dervalued, while bad firms are overvalued, and this creates an opportunity for firms to
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signal through stock repurchases. However, by repurchasing at the cross-sectional value,
good firms cannot separate themselves because bad firms would always mimic. That is,
from the incentive compatibility constrain of the bad firm, it can be shown that they will
always mimic because:
pBR− I +A < pB
1− βCS (R−
I
m
),
where βCS = A/(mR − I + A). It is straightforward to see that bad firms would always
mimic at the cross-sectional level because pBm < 1:
pBR− I +A < pBR− (I −A)pB
m
.
Note that if A > I, firms do not need to borrow to finance the project, and good-firm
managers can increase their utility by both investing in the project and engaging in bar-
gain repurchases. In this case, repurchases do not induce a change in investment, as firms
would have been able to invest without stock repurchases.5
Numerical Example (cont.). In the asymmetric information case, without any
signaling mechanism, firm’s equity values are V PG = 2.77 and V
P
B = 1.73. While good
firms are better off when they signal their type, they cannot do so by repurchasing shares
at the cross-sectional value. An alternative price at which good firms could repurchase
is their fundamental value. Consider the figures of the previous example. With repur-
chases, the good firm will be valued VG = 3 (without mimicking). If bad firms want to
pretend to be good, they have to repurchase shares at the good-firms price, i.e., VG = 3.
If they mimic good ones, they will receive the pooling contract, and the firm value will
be: V PB = 1.44, that is lower than the firm value in the separating equilibrium. Therefore,
they won’t mimic. Then, in equilibrium good firms repurchase at t = 0, and bad firms do
nothing. At t = 1 investors verify the number of shares repurchased and the price paid
and infer the firm type. Then, each firm will borrow at a cost of capital according to
their type. Notice that the signaling is costless, because both firms obtain the symmetric
information value. Finally, one can check that there exists a price below the good-firm
value such that bad firms will not mimic. In the example presented above, the price
is 2.79. In this case, managers of good firms are better off because they are paying less
than the fundamental value to selling-shareholders V
′
G = 3.12, but rational investors would
not accept this price because they will infer it comes from good firms, and will demand VG.
Then, at least for some parameter values, good firms could repurchase shares at fun-
damental value price, and bad firms do not mimic. Moreover, when the asymmetric in-
formation problem is severe, meaning that the supply of bad firms is large relative to the
supply of good firms, actual repurchases become more attractive for good firms because
5This is possible because repurchase activity is disclosed with some lag, and therefore, at
t = 0, investors cannot determine whether they are trading against informed or uninformed
investors. Fried (2014) argues that insiders have incentives to trade on private information
using repurchases to exploit weaker disclosure requirements of they have, compared to
direct insider trading, which has to be disclosed within 2 days.
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cross subsidization is larger. The following example illustrates this idea in the current
setting.
Numerical Example (cont.) Assume that α = 0.9 (that is, most firms are good),
business as usual. In that case, the good firm should repurchase 0.199 of the firm with the
cash available to separate from the bad firm, but the value of equity in this case V
′
G = 2.5
is lower than in the pooling equilibrium V GP = 2.96. Therefore, no one will repurchase
shares in this case. With a sufficiently large fraction of good firms (m→ pG), share repur-
chases are zero in equilibrium. In the current example, for α < 0.64 in equilibrium good
firms repurchase shares and bad firms do not mimic. However, for 0.56 < α < 0.64 the
repurchase price should be above the fundamental value price.
More formally, the good firm manager chooses the fraction of the firm that she is going
to buy back, β, with the cash available, A (price and quantity are jointly determined when
A is fixed), such that bad firms do not mimic, and investors are willing to sell,6
max
β
pGR− I
1− β
s.t. pBR− I +A ≥ pB
1− β (R−
I
m
)
β ≤ A
pGR− I +A
(A.6)
From the above equations it follows that β∗ will be,
β∗ = min{ A
pGR− I +A,
A− (1− pBm )I
pBR− I +A } (A.7)
Finally, the manager compares the firm value in the pooling (Eq. A.5) and the sepa-
rating equilibrium with repurchases (Eq. A.3). It follows that:{
β∗∗ = β∗ if β∗ > 1− m(pGR−I)pG(mR−I+A)
β∗∗ = 0 if β∗ ≤ 1− m(pGR−I)pG(mR−I+A)
So far it has been assumed that firms use all cash available to repurchase shares. This
assumption can be justified, omitting a formal proof. Asymmetric information means that
the firm is mispriced at t = 0, and there will be wealth transfers. Repurchases imply
a larger cost for bad firm managers, and good firms, realizing that, will repurchase the
largest possible amount. Failure of firms to put up to A would signal that the firm is bad.
Three final comments are in order. First, note that dividends cannot substitute for
stock repurchases as a signaling tool. The reason is that both firms can distribute A in
the form of cash dividends at t = 0 and will have to borrow I at t = 1. Because both
6Rational investors would interpret any deviation from the cross-sectional value as
coming from informed investors, and therefore, they would not accept a price below VG in
equilibrium.
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managers receive a fraction, δA, of dividends, the bad-firm manager will always mimic,
and there will be no separating equilibrium. In other words, there is no wealth transfer for
that manager to induce her not to mimic with dividends. Second, there is an increase in
investment with stock repurchases whenever there is market breakdown without signaling.
Under cross-subsidization, this simplified asymmetric information model fails to explain
the increase in investment. However, the inverse relationship between the cost of capital
and investment predicts that a decrease in the former will increase the latter.
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